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Investor-Driven Financial Innovation  
Kathryn Judge* 
 
Financial regulations often encourage or require market participants to hold 
particular types of financial assets. One unintended consequence of this form of 
regulation is that it can spur innovation to increase the effective supply of favored assets. 
This Article examines when and how changes in the law prompt the spread of “investor-
driven financial innovations.” Weaving together theory, recent empirical findings, and 
illustrations, this Article provides an overview of why investors prefer certain types of 
financial assets to others, how markets respond, and how the spread of investor-driven 
innovations can transform the structure of the financial system. This examination 
suggests that investor-driven innovations can enhance efficiency and provide other 
benefits, but they can also increase complexity, interconnectedness, and rigidity in ways 
that render the financial system as a whole more fragile. This Article thus draws 
attention to a core mechanism through which legal changes affect the structure and 
resilience of the financial system.  
This Article provides a framework for identifying the regulatory changes most 
likely to trigger investor-driven innovation, a critical first step toward improving 
rulemaking to reduce the likelihood of unintended consequences. The framework focuses 
attention on the need to develop an appropriate baseline when assessing the impact of an 
intervention and the need to cover the costs of innovation. This frame reveals that the 
regulations often blamed for contributing to bad forms of innovation are probably less 
transformative than commonly believed. Meanwhile, interventions outside the current 
debate could have important systemic effects.  
The main policy implication is that, when the framework warrants, regulators 
should assess how a proposed rule change is likely to impact investor preferences, the 
types of innovations that might arise or spread in response, and how the intervention 
might otherwise affect the financial system structure. Focusing attention on a specific 
mechanism through which legal changes can inadvertently alter the structure of the 
financial system can help regulators develop the data, models, and mindset they need to 
assess the systemic ramifications of their actions.  
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Today’s financial markets would be unrecognizable to those even at the forefront 
of finance a few decades ago. Starting with the leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s, 
banks and other financial institutions have created an almost endless array of new 
financial instruments.1 The current excitement around “fintech” is merely the most recent 
iteration of an ongoing process of innovation that has fundamentally transformed the 
structure of the financial system. Despite the recognized importance of financial 
                                                 
1 See infra Parts I–II. 
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innovation, the forces driving innovation and the consequences of that innovation remain 
incompletely understood and under-theorized.2 This Article helps to fill this gap.   
This Article examines the ways that innovations arise and spread to accommodate 
investor preferences. Much of modern corporate finance rests on the assumption that 
investors care only about maximizing their risk-adjusted returns.3 Even if some investors 
prefer certain types of financial assets, those preferences are assumed to disappear in the 
aggregate as other investors rebalance their portfolios accordingly. This assumption has 
enabled economists to craft and refine a cohesive framework for pricing a wide array of 
financial assets. At the same time, in emphasizing substitutability across financial asset 
types and investors’ interests in maximizing returns at the portfolio level, this frame 
cannot illuminate—and instead has tended to obscure—the related questions of what 
types of financial assets get produced and why. Taking investor preferences seriously 
helps to answer these questions and can explain a meaningful swathe of financial 
innovation.  
Once investors value financial instrument characteristics other than risk-adjusted 
returns, innovative methods that increase the effective supply of the desired instruments 
become viable. These innovations can entail repackaging cash flows from existing 
financial instruments, using derivatives to create new instruments with the desired 
characteristics, or combining these and other innovative techniques.4 By finding new 
ways to connect capital on the one hand, and value-creating projects on the other, 
financial innovations driven by investor demand can promote price efficiency and lower 
financing costs. Other ramifications, however, are less benign. Investor-driven innovation 
often entails the creation of complex new structures, new interconnections, and new types 
of instruments. These developments increase rigidity, create new mechanisms for 
contagion, and lead to new information gaps.5 Investor-driven financial innovations can 
thus contribute to systemic fragility and, at times, may even inhibit efficiency.6 
Of particular importance are the ways that legal interventions can dampen and 
accentuate these dynamics. Whenever a law requires or incentivizes institutions to hold 
                                                 
2 See infra Part I.C. 
3 See, e.g., Assar Lindbec, Professor of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Award Ceremony 
Speech, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1990 (Dec. 10, 
1990), (transcript available on the official website of the Nobel Prize) (explaining that the capital asset 
pricing model, which “has become the backbone of modern price theory of financial markets,” “shows that 
the optimum risk portfolio of a financial investor depends only on the portfolio manager’s prediction about 
the prospects of different assets, not on his own risk preferences”); Stephen A. Ross & Lawrence E. Blume, 
finance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. (Steven N. Durlauf et al. eds., 2d ed., 2008) (stating 
that “one of the central intuitions of finance” is “that close substitutes have the same price” and providing 
an overview of the main theoretical models, each of which assume that individual investor preferences do 
not affect the pricing of financial assets). 
4 See infra Part II.  
5 See infra Part III.B.2.  
6 See infra Part III.B.2. This Article is solely about the ways that constrained capital contributes to systemic 
risk via innovation. Constrained capital can also increase systemic risk through other mechanisms. See 
infra Part III.B.2. 
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particular types of financial assets, the law can increase demand and drive innovation.7 
Although this is not a new insight, policymakers and others involved in the ongoing 
debates about financial regulation routinely ignore these dynamics.8 This Article brings 
into focus the systemic costs of this failure to grapple with the ways the law can drive 
innovation. It also provides concrete guidance for how to improve the rulemaking process 
to address these dynamics.  
This Article’s first contribution is descriptive. This Article provides one of the 
first comprehensive accounts of “investor-driven financial innovation”—what it is, when 
it arises, and why it matters. This account brings together empirical evidence 
demonstrating that investor demand affects financial asset pricing and production with an 
institutional account of the reasons for demand discontinuities, how these discontinuities 
have led to particular financial innovations, and some consequences of those innovations. 
In weaving together findings from different fields of study, this analysis is more than just 
the sum of its parts. It instead paints a new and more striking picture of the importance of 
constrained capital in driving innovation than could be gleaned from any of the source 
materials. In so doing, it helps to answer the fundamental questions that persist regarding 
the reasons for financial innovation.9 
This Article’s second contribution is to identify the legal interventions most likely 
to trigger innovation. That financial market participants will seek to minimize the cost of 
regulatory compliance, creating the possibility of unintended consequences, is well 
known. The focus here is on a specific mechanism: When will a law so alter investor 
preferences as to encourage innovation? In providing a framework to answer this 
question, the analysis here goes within and beyond generalized notions of regulatory 
arbitrage to provide a structured way for regulators to consider the impact of a rule 
change on market structure.  
 For an intervention to trigger innovation: (1) the intervention must increase 
aggregate demand for a particular type of financial instrument, taking into account what 
                                                 
7 Also important but beyond the scope of this Article are the ways the government can crowd out private 
innovation by increasing the supply of favored assets. See infra Part V.B. 
8 A number of experts have recognized that particular regulations, like the risk-based prudential 
requirements imposed on banks, may have contributed to the spread of financial innovations at the heart of 
the Crisis. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Lev Ratnovski & Manmohan Singh, IMF Staff Discussion Note, 
Shadow Banking: Economics and Policy 12–13 (Dec. 2012) (identifying banks, especially in Europe, as a 
major source of demand for securitized assets pre-Crisis, and explaining how banks could use these assets 
to reduce regulatory burdens); Erik Gerding & Anna Gelpern, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 
398 (2016) (explaining how regulatory requirements that mandate or incentivize regulated entities to hold 
particular types of assets “tell potential buyers that an asset is safe, or at least safe enough for their 
purposes,” and “can deter market-based information discovery, promote information insensitivity, and 
boost the liquidity of labeled assets”); Ben S. Bernanke et al., Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers, International 
Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007 9–11 (Paper No. 1014, 2011) 
(showing that European institutions dramatically increased their holdings of AAA and other investment-
grade MBS in the years before the Crisis and identifying regulatory considerations as among the factors 
likely contributing to that change). Nonetheless, the post-Crisis reforms have increased the range of 
institutions subject to such regulations and have heightened the demands imposed on banks and other 
regulated entities. See infra Part IV.A.  
9 See infra Part I.C. 
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private demand would be in the absence of the intervention; and (2) that heightened 
demand must have a price impact sufficient to cover the costs of innovation. Although 
these conditions are readily inferred from fundamental principles, they provide a critical 
and otherwise missing framework for identifying the legal interventions most likely to 
induce innovation. The first condition shows that the actual impact of a legal intervention 
can only be assessed after developing an appropriate baseline that takes private demand 
into account, while the second condition enables filtering across domains.  
Applying this conceptual frame reveals that many rules that explicitly mandate 
that regulated entities hold particular types of assets are far less transformative than they 
might appear given the amount of capital affected.10 The capital requirements imposed on 
banks and insurance companies, for example, are not different in kind than the type of 
restrictions private claimants would impose in the absence of regulation, reducing the net 
effect of the intervention. By contrast, regulations that impose no direct requirements on 
institutions to hold particular types of assets are often more transformative than is 
commonly assumed. For example, restricting the capacity of the Federal Reserve to serve 
as a lender of last resort or making it costlier for banks to provide lines of credit may 
have the effect of increasing the demand for “safe assets” that can enable firms to self 
insure against the need for liquidity in the future. Although some of the inputs are 
dynamic and not easily measured, this conceptual framework enables systematic analysis 
of the dynamics that thus far have eluded critical scrutiny.  
Putting these pieces together, this Article shows how to improve the rulemaking 
process to address the impact of constrained capital on the structure and resilience of the 
financial system. First, in showing how investor preferences can drive innovation, this 
Article focuses attention on an identifiable mechanism through which changes in the law 
impact the development and spread of innovative instruments. Second, in providing a 
framework for recognizing those interventions most likely to spur innovation via the 
identified mechanism, this Article provides regulators a means for identifying when they 
should reconsider the prudence of a given action in light of its systemic consequences. 
The core claim is that when undertaking interventions likely to have a meaningful impact 
on aggregate investor preferences, regulators should be compelled to estimate the 
magnitude of the proposed impact and provide a written analysis of how the system may 
evolve in response to the intervention. As a starting point, these analyses should be 
required whenever regulators propose rules that directly require or incentivize regulated 
entities to hold specific types of financial assets, or when they seek to change existing 
rules in ways that could impact the supply or demand of so-called safe assets—an asset 
class particularly likely to spur systemically important innovation. 
Compelling regulators to consider how an intervention will affect the aggregate 
demand for a given class of financial instruments could serve as a critical first step in 
modifying the rulemaking process to better address the systemic ramifications of 
particular interventions. This proposal thus complements recent work on the 
shortcomings of cost-benefit analyses in financial regulation and the importance of a 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II.B. 
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macroprudential approach when regulating financial markets.11 Although regulators are 
likely to confront significant data and modeling charges when first undertaking the 
proposed analyses, the very process of identifying and seeking to address such 
deficiencies should enable regulators to develop a more sophisticated understanding of 
the intended and unintended consequences of their actions. In time, these processes could 
also spur a mapping of the financial system, enabling regulators to identify better ways to 
consider new approaches to enhancing the resilience of the system.  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents the paper’s claim and uses a 
couple of examples to bring the dynamics at issue to life. It also situates this Article in 
relation to the various bodies of literature on which it draws and to which it contributes. 
Part II examines two of the leading forces contributing to constrained capital in today’s 
financial system. Part III examines the types of financial innovations that arise and spread 
in response to investor preferences, in addition to providing an overview of the benefits 
and risks that accompany the proliferation of those financial innovations. Part IV 
provides the framework for understanding the interactions among the law, investor 
preferences, and innovation. Part V addresses bigger picture implications.  
I. The Basics 
A. Two Stories 
In the 1950s, as the director of the Corporate Bond Research Project sponsored by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research, Braddock Hickman undertook a large-scale 
study of the bond market and the factors influencing the returns investors earned on 
corporate bonds. In a report on his findings, Hickman observed that “[t]he most popular 
measures of prospective bond quality are the ratings assigned by the . . . investment 
agencies”—Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s.12 He found that ratings were 
relatively accurate proxies of risk, in the sense that loss rates went up as ratings declined. 
But, he also found that “[o]n the average and over long periods, the . . . yields realized on 
high-grade bonds were below those on low-grade bonds, with the result that investors, in 
the aggregate, obtained better returns on the low grades.”13  
Hickman also evaluated the way legal interventions beyond those tied to ratings 
affected investor demand and returns. At the time, mutual savings banks in many states 
were only allowed to hold bonds that appeared on lists promulgated by the relevant state 
authority. Hickman found that demand for bonds on these lists was sufficient to “push[] 
up the prices of legal bonds and push[] down their promised yields.”14 He concluded 
“that legal bonds taken individually were safer than nonlegal bonds[,] but that in the 
aggregate the promised and realized returns on legals were markedly lower.”15 Although 
                                                 
11 See infra Part V. 
12 W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 4 (1958). 
13 Id. at 14. Subsequent research has found that “during periods of stability in the economy and financial 
markets, the volatility of HY bond returns has been very similar to that of investment-grade bonds” but that 
“during periods of political or economic uncertainty, the volatility of HY bonds . . . approach[es] the 
volatility of common stocks.” Frank K. Reilly et al., Historic Changes in the High Yield Bond Market, 21 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65, 76 (2009). 
14 HICKMAN, supra note 12, at 214.  
15 Id. (emphasis added). 
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his methodology was rudimentary by today’s standards, his findings were sufficient to 
suggest that investor preferences can lead to pricing inefficiencies and that regulations 
can accentuate those inefficiencies.16  
Less than a decade later, a young undergraduate at U.C. Berkeley by the name of 
Michael Milken came across Hickman’s report. In that report, Milken found empirical 
support for his longstanding hunch that one could make outsized returns in the market 
without assuming excessive risk if one knew where to look.17 Armed with his instincts 
and Hickman’s findings, Milken took to Wall Street. In the early 1970s, as a trader for 
investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert, Milken convinced clients that buying high-
yield bonds would allow them to earn higher average returns than they could earn holding 
investment-grade alternatives, even taking into account the higher risk of default.18 He 
gained both credibility and clientele when high-yield bonds proved remarkably resilient 
even as equities crashed a few years later.19  
By the end of the decade, Milken began to leverage Drexel’s dominant role in the 
secondary market for high-yield debt to encourage more companies to issue such debt 
and to have Drexel underwrite those offerings.20  
The amount of high-yield debt outstanding grew rapidly, much of it underwritten 
by Drexel.21 The market ultimately collapsed, bringing both Milken and Drexel down 
with it,22 but high-yield debt came back. Milken’s insight, built on Hickman’s findings, 
that high-yield debt could provide attractive risk-adjusted returns endured, and such debt 
now constitutes approximately a quarter of the outstanding corporate debt in the United 
States.23  
This brief story illustrates a number of key dynamics. Hickman’s findings reflect 
how investor demand can lead to meaningful price and demand discontinuities and the 
way regulations can contribute to those discontinuities. Milken’s initial response to those 
pricing discontinuities illustrates a variation on arbitrage as traditionally understood. 
Although Milken’s clients were not taking hedged positions, and thus were not engaged 
in classic arbitrage, they were exploiting a statistically proven price anomaly to earn 
excess returns relative to the risks they were assuming. And, in the process, those 
investors were changing the prices of the instruments they were acquiring in a way that 
enhanced market efficiency.  
                                                 
16 As techniques have improved, including the use of standard-asset pricing models and other devices to 
develop baselines for the appropriate return on an instrument, recent research has reaffirmed these early 
findings. See, e.g., Victoria Ivashina & Zheng Sun, Institutional Demand Pressure and the Cost of 
Corporate Loans, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 502 (2011) (explaining how the paper’s “findings contribute to the 
vast literature documenting the effects of capital inflow,” providing an overview of that literature, and 
explaining that it runs contrary to what one would expect if financial markets were perfectly efficient). 
17 Stars of the Junkyard, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17306419.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See Frank K. Reilly et al., supra note 13, at 66–67. 
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This account also highlights the ways that discontinuities in investor demand can 
shape the type of financial instruments produced. Until Milken’s activities spurred an 
interest in high-yield debt, “all new publicly issued bonds [sold in the United States 
during the twentieth century] were investment grade.”24 The little high-yield debt trading 
in the secondary market consisted of “fallen angels,” bonds that had been investment 
grade when issued but were subsequently downgraded.25 The strong preference investors 
had for investment-grade debt not only affected pricing during this period, but also 
effectively precluded the issuance of high-yield debt.  
This story also sets the stage for a second vignette that illustrates how investor 
demand can lead to the development and proliferation of even more innovative financial 
instruments. Investor demand for investment-grade bonds, particularly those rated AAA, 
not only created a profit opportunity for Milken’s early clients, but also contributed to the 
spread of securitization structures leading up to the Crisis.26 Securitization enables 
unrated credit products, like home loans, to be transformed into rated credit products, like 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by those loans.27 It also allows lower rated 
credit instruments, like a BBB-rated MBS, to be transformed into higher rated ones, like 
a AAA-rated collateralized debt obligation (CDO).  
No voodoo is required to achieve these transformations. So long as there is 
limited correlation among the underlying instruments, the combination of diversification 
and tranching—the process of creating a hierarchy among the instruments issued—makes 
it possible to redistribute the credit risk inherent in the underlying assets to produce some 
instruments that are riskier than the original assets and others that are far less so.28  
In the frame proposed here, the pre-Crisis investor demand for AAA-rated assets 
exemplifies constrained capital. Some of this demand arose independent of legal 
interventions, but regulatory regimes, like the risk-based capital adequacy requirements 
imposed on banks, also contributed.29 Such regimes enabled banks to reduce the amount 
of capital they had to hold by increasing their holdings of AAA-rated assets and certain 
sovereign debt. Some such instruments already existed, but there is a limit to the amount 
of debt that AAA-rated firms and creditworthy sovereigns want to issue. Once the 
demand exceeds that supply, securitization structures could be used to fill the void.  
                                                 
24 Glenn Yago, Junk Bonds, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (2008), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/JunkBonds.html (emphasis added).  
25 See id.  
26 See, e.g., Bernanke et al., supra note 8 (verifying that “the ‘[global saving glut] countries’ . . . did indeed 
evince a strong preference for the safest U.S. assets,” and explaining that, “this preference most likely 
helped push down yields on MBS relative to other assets, as most MBS were either guaranteed by the 
Agencies or sold as tranches carrying AAA credit ratings,” given the proportion of MBS “carrying AAA 
credit ratings”). 
27 See generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2003). 
28 See infra Part III.A.1. 
29 E.g., Bernanke et al., supra note 8; Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: 
How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1539 (2015).  
  9
In the short-run, these processes appeared to create significant value and the cost 
of obtaining a home loan went down as a result.30 Of course, that was only half of the 
story. The Crisis revealed that these innovations, and the ways they altered the structure 
of the financial markets, also gave rise to new risks. The Crisis further revealed that many 
securitized assets had been trading at inflated prices.31 Nonetheless, the basic rationale for 
securitization remains sound, and securitization transactions have rebounded 
accordingly.32 More broadly, securitization remains a transaction form that makes no 
sense in a world where financial assets are priced solely on characteristics such as risk 
and return. The finance literature has proffered some explanations for these transactions, 
and the incredible rate at which these transactions spread pre-Crisis is over-determined, 
with fraud and regulatory arbitrage likely exacerbating the rate of growth.33 Nonetheless, 
a notable factor contributing to the proliferation of these transactions was that they 
converted financial instruments that investors were not particularly keen to hold into 
instruments that investors were very keen to hold.34 The development of new forms of 
securitization and the proliferation of securitization structures thus exemplify investor-
driven innovation.35 
B. The Framework 
This Article’s core theoretical contribution is to provide a frame for understanding 
the relationship among investor preferences, regulation, and investor-driven financial 
innovation. The framework has two components. First, for a regulation to spur 
innovation, it must increase the aggregate demand for financial instruments with 
particular characteristics. Second, the heightened demand that results must increase the 
price, and thus lower the yield, of the affected class of financial instruments. This is 
critical to cover the costs associated with developing and using more innovative 
structures. Although largely a return to fundamentals, each element of this framing yields 
insights regarding the consequences of the ongoing efforts to build a more stable 
financial system. 
The first condition reveals that in order to assess the impact of a given 
intervention, one must also consider what investor preferences would look like in the 
absence of the intervention. The regulatory schemes imposed on banks and insurance 
companies, for example, entail meaningful restrictions on the types and mix of assets 
                                                 
30 See infra Part III.B.  
31 See infra Part III.B. 
32 See, e.g., Nick Clements, Led By Student Loans, Marketplace Lending Securitization Volume Soars, 
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickclements/2016/10/21/led-by-student-loans-
marketplace-lending-securitization-volume-soars/#565c69b23c23 (“Marketplace lending securitization 
volume has increased 86% compared to last year, with $5.4 billion already issued this year.”); Michael 
Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Investment Riches Built on Subprime Auto Loans to Poor, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 26, 2015), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/investment-riches-built-on-auto-loans-to-
poor/?_r=0 (showing a dramatic increase in subprime auto loan securitizations after the Crisis, with total 
volume exceeding $20 billion in 2014).  
33 See generally Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 1061 
(1996); Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity, 45 J. FINANCE 49 
(1990). 
34 See infra Part II.A. 
35 See infra Part III.A. 
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these institutions can hold. The role each regime plays in shaping investor preferences is 
thus widely recognized and a source of ongoing policy debate.36 This Article suggests 
that these constraints may be less important than they first appear, at least with respect to 
the tendency of such regimes to drive investor-driven financial innovations. This is 
because the constraints are imposed, at least in part, to address the agency costs that 
would otherwise arise from the separation between the person making the investment 
decision and the person who stands to gain or lose from those decisions. As a result, these 
entities would almost assuredly be subject to private constraints on their investment 
activity even in the absence of regulation. And to the extent a legal intervention serves as 
a substitute for equivalent private monitoring, the regulation does not itself alter the 
aggregate demand for a particular class of financial instruments. These types of 
interventions still matter, as these regimes likely do have an impact on the location and 
size of discontinuities in investor demand for various financial instruments, but using an 
appropriate baseline puts the magnitude of the issue at stake in perspective. 
The framework proffered here simultaneously reveals that other regulatory 
interventions are far more transformative than is commonly appreciated. Efforts to reduce 
externalities by imposing portfolio or other asset restrictions on entities, for example, can 
fundamentally alter investor preferences.37 Even more striking, and more overlooked, is 
the significant impact of interventions that encourage firms (or sovereigns) to self-insure 
against the need for liquidity in the future on the aggregate demand for money-like 
instruments and other safe assets.38 Legal changes that make it more costly for banks to 
provide liquidity insurance, like credit lines, to nonfinancial firms, and changes that make 
it more difficult for banks to rely on government-backed liquidity, like rules proscribing 
the capacity of the Federal Reserve to serve as the lender of last resort, illustrate this 
dynamic. These changes may be justified by other considerations, but they nonetheless 
have the effect of fundamentally altering the quantity of money claims and other safe 
assets that nonfinancial and financial firms, respectively, must hold on their individual 
balance sheets to cover uncertain future funding needs.  
The second condition serves as a filter for identifying which of the interventions 
that affect aggregate demand are most likely to trigger innovation. The key assumption, 
which is consistent with the literature and the examples here provided, is that innovation 
remains costly.39 If markets are awash in long-term corporate debt, for example, then a 
new requirement that incentivizes life insurers to increase their holdings of long-term 
debt would not suffice to spur innovation.40 To be sure, a regulated entity that seeks to 
                                                 
36 See infra Part IV.A. 
37 See infra Part II. 
38 See infra Part II.B. 
39 See e.g., Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A Counterfactual 
Research Agenda, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 41, 45 (2011) (“[Financial] innovations are not easy or cheap to 
develop and diffuse . . . . [I]nvestment banks frequently retain many highly compensated PhDs, MBAs, and 
lawyers to design new products and services [and] innovators must frequently expend considerable 
resources developing distribution channels for their products.”). This point also comes through in the 
examples in Part III.A., infra.  
40 This is not to say that such a regulation may not have unintended consequences. To the extent the 
“natural” supply of an asset is elastic, such an intervention could increase primary issuances of assets 
favored by the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., John R. Graham et al., How Does Government Borrowing 
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minimize the cost of complying with the constraint may seek assets that satisfy the letter 
but not the spirit of the constraint by offering a higher return and nominally disguised 
risk. Nonetheless, when the financial system can readily absorb the increased marginal 
demand arising from the regulatory intervention, that intervention does not give rise to 
the type of innovation here at issue. Regulatory arbitrage is thus an overlapping and 
related, but distinct, dynamic.41 
This second condition has two important implications. First, it suggests that 
interventions are most likely to lead to innovation when there is some limit on the volume 
of the desired instruments that can readily be produced through primary issuances and 
demand, exclusive of the intervention, is already approaching that limit. Focusing on the 
need for a price impact, and thus on the demand and supply of a given class of financial 
instruments, also brings to the fore the importance of considering the impact of an 
intervention over the credit cycle. During boom times, it is not uncommon for the size of 
the overall financial sector to grow rapidly and the demand for particular types of 
instruments to increase accordingly.42 U.S. Treasuries, again, demonstrate the type of 
asset that will often not proliferate at the same rate that the system as a whole, and 
demand for safe assets, may be increasing. This, in turn, increases the probability that a 
regulation that requires or incentivizes institutions to hold such instruments will have the 
necessary price impact.43 This is consistent with experience but not yet broadly 
understood or taken into consideration when contemplating interventions that could 
profoundly impact the demand for such instruments. 
In order to illuminate the relationship between constrained capital and financial 
innovation, and the ways legal interventions affect this dynamic, this Article holds 
constant or delays consideration of a range of other variables. Among the most important 
variables given secondary status for most of the analysis are the myriad ways the 
government affects the supply of certain types of financial instruments. The question of 
which actors are most likely to seek out substitutes and what qualifies as a substitute in 
different states of the world are also important factors that are addressed only 
tangentially. These dynamics are too fundamental to be cabined entirely but they are not 
incorporated into the basic framework in order to make the analysis tractable. The 
importance and relevance of these considerations and the ways that more sophisticated 
treatment of these factors could inform further research that builds on the framework 
presented here are discussed in connection with assessing the implication of this Article’s 
core claim.44 
C. Situating the Contribution 
This Article makes two contributions. One is to provide and apply a framework 
for understanding when the law is likely to drive innovation via changes in investor 
                                                                                                                                                 
Affect Corporate Financing and Investment? 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20581, 2014).  
41 See infra Part I.C. 
42 See e.g., GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM 
COMING 19 (2012). 
43 See infra Part III.B. 
44 See infra Part III.B. 
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preferences. The other is to provide a descriptive account of where investor preferences 
arise and some of the innovations that have been created and spread to satisfy those 
preferences. This analysis brings together heretofore disparate insights and data into a 
cohesive account that helps explain an array of financial market structures that are not 
readily explained by traditional approaches to corporate finance. This descriptive 
undertaking is the task of Parts II and III.  
The depth of the descriptive account reflects the fact that it does more than serve 
as a foundation for the framework this Article proposes for understanding a particular 
mechanism through which the law shapes financial market structures. It also serves to 
highlight the centrality of investor preferences in shaping the types of financial 
instruments produced and the structure of the financial system, and to provide an 
institutional framework for understanding those preferences. The framing, which places 
the frictions that help to explain the existence of various institutions in the background, 
rather than in the foreground they typically occupy in the economics literature, is 
designed to be more user friendly for policymakers and legal academics. This framing 
also serves to push against the assumption that the structures here examined are merely 
the byproduct of the influence of powerful financial intermediaries.45 It does not discount 
that such influence provides a partial explanation, but that explanation is only partial.46 
Understanding why investors may desire particular types of instruments, and how 
complex arrangements may at times be a byproduct of the effort to satisfy those demands, 
is critical to developing a more complete picture of how we got to where we are and the 
realistic options for where we can go from here.  
The literature on financial innovation, both in terms of drivers and effects, is 
remarkably modest relative to its importance. Recent reviews of the literature on financial 
innovation emphasize the relative paucity of the research, despite the fact that “financial 
innovation is ubiquitous.”47 The contrast is even more striking when compared to the far 
more extensive body of research on innovation in other domains.48 For example, a 2004 
research review could locate only 39 empirical studies of financial innovation, of which 
                                                 
45 There is a growing literature on “financialization,” some of which allows for the nuances this Article 
develops, but some of which assumes that financial intermediaries are self-interested in lieu of (rather than 
in connection with) serving the interests of investors and society more generally. See generally FRANCES 
THOMSON & SAHIL DUTTA, THE TRANSNAT’L INST., FINANCIALIZATION: A PRIMER (2016). 
46 The claims here are best understood as complementary to claims that highlight the importance of 
financial intermediary influence in distorting, but not completely eliminating, the tendency of market forces 
to lead to efficient outcomes. See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern 
Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012) (arguing that the complexity of financial markets and 
the rate of innovation in those markets undermine the strong assumptions regarding “market 
fundamentalism” that motivated much of the deregulatory agenda prior to the Crisis); see also Kathryn 
Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2016) (arguing that in developing the informational 
and positional advantages that enable them to be effective intermediaries, intermediaries simultaneously 
develop the capacity to exercise outsized influence on institutional design).   
47 See Lerner & Tufano, supra note 39, at 40; see also W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical 
Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 116 (2004) (“A 
striking feature of this literature . . . is the relative dearth of empirical studies that specifically test 
hypotheses or otherwise provide a quantitative analysis of financial innovation.”).  
48 See Lerner & Tufano, supra note 39, at 40. 
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only two focused on the origins (rather than diffusion) of innovations.49 The gap between 
importance and scholarly attention is even wider with respect to the role of regulation in 
inadvertently driving innovation. A recent review of “Empirical Research on the Design 
and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector” describes the findings of over 120 
studies, none of which addresses the ways bank regulation can influence the spread of 
innovative financial instruments.50 Thus, an important function of this Article is gap 
filling. 
This Article’s institutionally focused description of investor-driven innovation is 
largely in accord with the limited formal work done in this area. In particular, although 
framed differently, this account is consistent with work by Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei 
Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, showing that “investor demand for particular cash flow 
patterns” results in excessive issuance of new instruments and fragility when, as this 
account confirms, too little heed is paid to highly improbable risks.51 It is also consistent 
with the informal claims often made with respect to the significance of recent regulatory 
reforms, though, again, the contribution here is to make those dynamics more concrete 
and to place them into a broader theoretical frame.52 
Another line of work relevant here is that on the role of law in shaping the 
financial system, and the specific role the law plays in the domain of safe assets.53 As 
Katharina Pistor has shown, the law plays a first-order role in determining the structure, 
and fragility, of the financial system.54 This Article builds on that insight by drawing 
attention to a specific mechanism through which the law plays this constitutive role. Of 
particular relevance is work by Anna Gelpern and Erik Gerding that provides a typology 
of the ways the law affects the demand for safe assets, the supply of seemingly safe 
assets, and perceptions of so-called safe assets as safe.55 This Article complements their 
work and that of other scholars who have shown, empirically and otherwise, the 
importance of recognizing the distinct role of safe assets in financial markets.56 In 
contrast to Gelpern and Gerding, this piece focuses more narrowly on the role of law in 
                                                 
49 See Frame & White, supra note 47, at 117. 
50 Sanja Jakovljevic et al., A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the 
Banking Sector, 7 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 423 (2015). 
51 Nicola Gennaioli et al., Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility 453 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16068, 2010).   
52 See, e.g., Robin Greenwood et al., The Financial Regulatory Reform Agenda in 2017 7 (Harv. Univ. 
Working Paper, 2017) (stating that “because the [new liquidity coverage ratio] may consume large 
quantities of high-quality liquid assets like Treasuries, it could potentially create a costly and unnecessary 
shortage of such assets”); see also IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: The Quest for Lasting Stability 
(Apr. 2012) (predicting a shortage of safe assets in part because of prudential and other regulations 
requiring institutions to hold safe assets or to have them to post as collateral in derivative transactions, and 
identifying liquidity and capital requirements as among the forces likely to lead to excess demand for safe 
assets).  
53 See generally Gary B. Gorton, The History and Economics of Safe Assets 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 22210, 2016). 
54 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315 (2013), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014759671300036X. 
55 See Gelpern & Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, supra note 8, at 376; see also Anna Gelpern & Erik F. 
Gerding, Private and Public Ordering in Safe Asset Markets, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. (2015). 
56 See supra Part I.A. 
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influencing demand, while expanding the analysis to reveal the way the law can create 
demand by altering private preferences. 
The literature on regulatory arbitrage is also relevant.57 Regulatory arbitrage, a 
term broadly used for actions taken to minimize the cost of regulatory compliance, is 
closely related to the dynamics here at issue. Improving our understanding of investor-
driven financial innovation will shed light on some of the when and why of regulatory 
arbitrage, important dynamics for developing ex ante mechanisms for addressing the 
inevitable fact that the financial system will evolve to minimize the cost of regulatory 
compliance. Not all of the dynamics here at issue, however, are forms of regulatory 
arbitrage. As reflected in the history of safe assets, there is a regular pattern of private 
assets being treated as safe during periods of economic growth, leading to an increase in 
the issuance of such assets.58 Legal interventions may exacerbate (or dampen) this 
growth, but these dynamics pre-exist the regulatory state and private demand continues to 
be central.59 That some of the most creative forms of supposedly safe assets that spread 
before the Crisis, like auction rate securities, could not be used to satisfy any regulatory 
requirement highlights the importance of understanding investor-driven innovation as 
something more than just a form of regulatory arbitrage.   
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the importance of this Article’s contribution 
is to look at the confusion that pervades recent policymaking. This is illustrated in the 
work product produced by staff at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when 
the SEC was assessing how to improve the consideration of how to change the rules 
governing money market mutual funds. On the one hand, the SEC seemed to recognize 
that regulations could play an important role in spurring innovation. In 2014, SEC staff 
prepared a memorandum on safe assets that identifies the need “to fulfill prudential 
requirements” as a notable source of the pre-Crisis demand for seemingly safe assets, 
such as the AAA-rated MBS.60 The memorandum further recognizes that “monetary 
policies and regulatory reforms in the wake of the . . . Crisis . . . have increased the 
demand for safe assets, and it acknowledges recent reports that suggest the demand for 
such assets may well outstrip supply.”61  
                                                 
57 See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010); see also Merton 
Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next 21, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
459 (1986) (suggesting that regulatory and tax changes are the core drivers of financial innovation). 
58 See Gorton, supra note 53, at 2 (“Financial crises are often preceded by credit booms, and these booms 
tend to occur when there is insufficient safe government debt.”); see also Gelpern & Gerding, Inside Safe 
Assets, supra note 8, at 376 (“In a credit boom, many public and private contracts look safe, substitute for 
one another, and serve as inputs in new private safe assets.”). 
59 E.g., Gorton, supra note 53, at 560 (observing that “[p]rivately-produced safe debt has taken the form of 
goldsmith notes, bills of exchange, bank notes, demand deposits, certificates of deposit, commercial paper, 
sale and repurchase agreements, to name a few” and providing an overview of the history of how private 
demand for safe assets has led to the proliferation of such instruments independent of any state 
intervention). 
60 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ECON. AND RISK ANALYSIS, DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF SAFE ASSETS IN 
THE ECONOMY (2014), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/economic-analyses/demand-supply-safe-
assets-2014.pdf. 
61 Id. The “natural” supply of safe assets consists primarily of certain sovereign debt, assets backed by a 
credible sovereign, like insured deposits, and the highest quality corporate debt. 
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On the other hand, the memorandum suggests that the SEC need not worry about 
these dynamics when contemplating reforms that could exacerbate the shortage.62 One 
reason is that “sustained excess demand for safe assets should increase the price of safe 
assets,” which “should attract new private-label safe assets to the market” and incentivize 
“market participants . . . to identify new sources of safe assets and ways to transform 
asset risk.”63 In other words, the memorandum assumes that the possibility of triggering 
new financial innovations is a reason not to worry, rather than a reason to worry about the 
impact of a proposed reform.  
Eventually, the SEC adopted a rule that did have the effect of significantly 
increasing demand for a particular type of safe asset with little consideration of how the 
system would supply those assets. Implementation of that rule has had the important and 
unintended consequence of increasing dramatically the size of the Federal Home Loan 
Banks, a lesser known government-sponsored enterprise.64 Although this development 
entails interactions between private and quasi-public actors, it is an important structural 
change to the financial system, one that has significant ramifications for stability and 
taxpayer exposure, and one that occurred because of a regulatory intervention that 
increased the demand for a particular set of safe assets.65 This is emblematic of the type 
of intervention that this Article argues should not proceed without meaningful 
consideration of the systemic ramifications, and hence is a nice example of a concrete 
setting where application of this Article’s policy claim may have resulted in a very 
different outcome.  
Few other regulators have celebrated the possibility that their post-Crisis reforms 
could trigger innovation, but many have shown a similar disregard for how reforms will 
affect investor demand and the innovations that might arise as a result.66 This Article’s 
descriptive account provides much needed clarity with respect to these dynamics and the 
framework proposed provides a way out of the morass. 
II. Constrained Capital  
For investor-driven financial innovation to merit attention, investor preferences 
must be sufficiently strong and sufficiently common to play a meaningful role shaping 
the types of instruments the financial system creates. This Part establishes that 
prerequisite. The analysis here seeks to show that investor preferences informed by 
regulation are intertwined with those arising entirely outside the regulated space. This 
structure reflects the view that these two types of demand are inherently interconnected, 
                                                 
62 Id. at 4–5.  
63 Id. at 4. 
64 Jonathon Adams-Kane & Jakob Wilhelmus, The Real Story Behind the Surge in FHLB Advances: 
Macroprudential Policy Changed How Banks Borrow 5 (Milken Inst., Working Paper, 2017) (explaining 
that “the implementation of new rules for MMFs, which mandated floating NAV and gates and fees on 
redemptions, was the main driver of the acceleration of [Federal Home Loan Bank] advances in mid- to late 
2016”).   
65 Id. at 7 (explaining that as a result of the growth of the Federal Home Loan Bank system triggered by the 
reforms to money market mutual funds, “[p]rivate financial intermediaries are now even more 
interconnected with GSEs” and “[p]otentially, taxpayers now bear more of the remaining risk in the 
financial system”). 
66 See infra Part IV.A. 
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and the ramifications of regulatory and other legal interventions can only be understood 
in light of how they also impact private demand. Part IV disaggregates the role of 
regulation and how regulation shapes demand. With respect to scope, the aim is to 
illustrate rather than exhaust the sources of constrained capital. Focusing on two core 
reasons for constrained capital is helpful for understanding where discontinuities are 
likely to arise and why they may be difficult to eliminate, but there is an array of other 
sources on constrained capital not discussed here.  
A. Money and Other Safe Assets 
Financial instruments that function like money have long served distinct socially 
useful functions. These functions include the capacity of money-like claims to facilitate 
transacting and to serve as a store of value over time.67 Precious metals, which were the 
original form of money, and the fiat currencies of modern economies, like dollar bills, are 
the most obvious forms of money. At the same time, other financial instruments, from the 
privately issued banknotes that were common prior to the Civil War to the short-term 
commercial paper that remains prevalent today, have long served a similar function and 
have been priced accordingly.68  
The full range of financial instruments that have money-like qualities, and the 
relationship between the demand for money and income levels and interest rates, remain 
contested.69 There is also disagreement about the relevance of long-term safe assets as 
most money-like claims are quite short term.70 But these disagreements about where and 
                                                 
67 These functions are sometimes characterized as the “transaction motive” and “asset motive” for holding 
money-like claims. See generally Andrew Hill, Functions and Characteristics of Money: A Lesson to 
Accompany The Federal Reserve and You (Philadelphia Fed. Res., 2013), 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/education/teachers/resources/fed-
today/Functions_and_Characteristics_of_Money_Lesson.pdf. 
68 See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 42, at 10 (explaining that “[i]n market economies, consumers rely heavily 
on bank-created money” and providing an array of historical examples); FRIEDRICH HAYEK, PRICES AND 
PRODUCTION 113 (2d ed. 1935) (“There can be no doubt that besides the regular types of the circulating 
medium, such as coin, notes and bank deposits, which are generally recognized to be money . . . and . . . 
which is regulated by some central authority . . . there exist still other forms of media of exchange which 
occasionally or permanently do the service of money.”); Perry Mehrling et al., Bagehot Was a Shadow 
Banker: Shadow Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance 9 (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232016 (“Why insist on holding genuine Tbills when quasi-Tbills [i.e., private 
money,] promise the same liquidity but with a slightly higher yield?”). 
69 E.g., Stephen M. Goldfeld & Daniel E. Sichel, The Demand for Money, in 1 HANDBOOK MONETARY 
ECON. 299, 300 (Benjamin M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds., 1990) (explaining that “the demand for 
money in many countries has been subjected to extensive empirical scrutiny” and while “[t]he evidence that 
emerged . . . prior to the mid-1970s[] suggested that a few variables (essentially income and interest rates . . 
. ) were capable of providing a plausible and stable explanation of money demand[,]” it “has been widely 
documented, . . . [that] matters have been considerably less satisfactory since the mid-1970s”). 
70 Compare Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, A Comparative-Advantage 
Approach to Government Debt Maturity, 70 J. FINANCE 1683, 1687 (2015) (showing that holders of short-
term Treasuries pay a premium relative to “what one would expect based on an extrapolation of the rest of 
the yield curve” for other Treasury instruments); Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin 
Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System, 22 FIN. MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 283, 283–84 (2013) 
(distinguishing his work from that done by others in its focus on short-term safe assets); and Bernanke et 
al., supra note 8 (invoking as useful the concept of safe assets that include longer term instruments); Gary 
B. Gorton, Stefan Lewellen & Andrew Metrick, The Safe-Asset Share, 102 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & 
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how to draw boundaries are secondary to the core point: There is outsized demand for 
money-like financial instruments relative to what one would expect if viewing these 
instruments solely as investments.  
One way that economists have empirically established the demand for money-like 
instruments is by focusing on the premium that investors are willing to pay for financial 
instruments that have some degree of “moneyness.” For example, Arvind Krishnamurthy 
and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen examine the premium investors are willing to pay for 
Treasury instruments, which are presumed to be essentially free of credit risk and to have 
virtually no liquidity risk.71 They found a “monetary premium” that averaged 72 basis 
points between 1926 and 2008.72 In subsequent work, they show that the aggregate 
amount of short-term debt issued by the financial sector is inversely related to the 
aggregate amount of government debt outstanding.73 Based on this and other findings, 
they “argue that the amount of short-term debt in the economy, issued by the financial 
sector, is in large part driven by the non-financial sector’s willingness to pay a premium 
on liquid/safe debt.”74 
Others take the position that even within the market for Treasury instruments, 
shorter duration instruments are more money-like and can demand a premium 
accordingly. For example, Robin Greenwood and co-authors sought to compare the 
actual yields on T-bills, which had maturities from 1 to 24 weeks, with the yield one 
would expect for those instruments if one merely extrapolated the expected yield from a 
yield curve created of Treasury instruments with yields longer than three months.75 They 
found “four-week bills have yields that are roughly 40 basis points (bps) below their 
fitted values; for one-week bills, the spread is about 60 bps.”76 In their view, “these z-
spreads . . . reflect a money-like premium on short-term T-bills above and beyond the 
liquidity and safety premia embedded in longer term Treasury yields.”77 
While short-term Treasuries display an exceptional degree of moneyness, 
privately produced financial claims can also serve money-like functions. This is reflected 
in the work by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, and also demonstrated by other 
recent empirical work. Another study, for example, shows that the premium that investors 
are willing to pay for commercial paper and other high-quality debt issued by large U.S. 
firms is inversely related to the volume of Treasuries outstanding.78 And a different study 
                                                                                                                                                 
PROCEEDINGS 101 (2012) (same). For a helpful analysis of the growth of safe assets as a concept, see 
Gerding & Gelpern, supra note 8. 
71 Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt, 120 J. 
POL. ECON. 233 (2012). 
72 Id. 
73 Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Short-term Debt and the Financial Crisis: What 
We Can Learn from U.S. Treasury Supply, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming). 
74 Id. at *32. 
75 See Greenwood et al., supra note 70.  
76 Id. at 1687, 1688 fig.1; see also Gregory R. Duffee, Idiosyncratic Variation of Treasury Bill Yields, 51 J. 
FINANCE 527 (1996); Refet S. Gürkaynak, Brian Sack & Jonathan H. Wright, The US Treasury Yield 
Curve: 1961 to the Present, 54 J. MONETARY ECON. 2291 (2007).  
77 Greenwood et al., supra note 70, at 1687. 
78 See Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 68; John R. Graham, Mark T. Leary & Michael R. 
Roberts, How Does Government Borrowing Affect Corporate Financing and Investment? 3–4 (Nat’l 
 
  18
by Mark Carlson and other economists provides yet further evidence of “the extent to 
which public short-term debt and private short-term debt” function as “substitutes,” by 
examining the relationship between the level of issuance of public and private short-term 
instruments.79 Carlson and his co-authors “find that several money-market instruments—
such as financial and non-financial commercial paper (CP), asset-backed CP, and time 
deposits—exhibit a strong negative relationship with the amount of Treasury bills 
outstanding.”80 They further show that within two or three months of a shock in the 
supply of public short-term, safe instruments, there is a change in the rate of issuance of 
private substitutes.81 These findings suggest that private short-term, safe instruments can 
serve as substitutes for short-term Treasuries, but the degree to which investors will pay a 
moneyness premium for such instruments—and hence the issuance of such instruments—
depends on the supply of Treasury instruments. 
That private claims serve money-like functions is also reflected in definitions of 
what constitutes money. For example, central banks often track multiple indicators of the 
aggregate amount of “money” in the system at any given time: M1, which includes only 
cash and coin in circulation; M2, which also includes short-term bank deposits and 
money market mutual funds with a maturity of less than 24 hours; and, sometimes, M3, 
which further includes longer-term time deposits and money market mutual funds with 
maturities over 24 hours.82 For purposes of U.S. accounting standards, highly liquid 
instruments with maturities of up to three months, like commercial paper and money 
market funds, can generally be characterized as “cash equivalents.”83 Professor Morgan 
Ricks argues that virtually all debt with a maturity of less than a year should be deemed 
money-like and should be heavily regulated accordingly.84  
One challenge with drawing any bright line around money-like claims is that the 
types of financial claims that enjoy money-like status vary across different states of the 
world. During boom times, the demand for money-like assets often exceeds the supply of 
truly safe assets and history suggests that during such periods, private money-like 
instruments, from bank notes to asset-backed commercial paper, are regularly created and 
accepted to satiate this excess demand.85 Times of crisis, by contrast, are characterized by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20581, 2014) (finding “a robust and statistically 
significantly negative relation between the BAA-AAA corporate bond spread and the government debt-to-
GDP (and debt-to-asset) ratio,” and conducting various tests that further suggest that nonfinancials play a 
significant, and increasingly important role, “fulfilling excess demand [for safe securities] due to variation 
in the supply of Treasuries”). 
79 Mark Carlson et al., The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some Evidence 
and Implications for Central Bank Policies, 12 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 307 (2016). 
80 Id. at 309. 
81 Id. 
82 E.g., Fin. Times Lexicon, Definition of M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=m0,-m1,-
m2,-m3,-m4 (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
83 E.g., MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 37 (2016). 
84 Id. at 230-37; Kathryn Judge, The Importance of “Money”, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1148 (2017) (reviewing 
RICKS, supra note 83). 
85 See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 42. 
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a growing demand for cash and a refusal to accept as money-like instruments that were 
accorded that status just before the crisis broke out.86  
Taking a different tack to assessing the demand for money-like instruments, 
Zoltan Pozsar documents the growth of “institutional cash pool[s]”—“large, centrally 
managed, short-term cash balances of global non-financial corporations and institutional 
investors such as asset managers, securities lenders and pension funds.”87 Pozsar shows 
that just “between 2003 and 2008, institutional cash pools’ demand for insured deposit 
alternatives exceeded the outstanding amount of short-term government guaranteed 
instruments not held by foreign official investors by . . . at least $1.5 trillion,” and 
potentially far more.88 In his view, “the ‘shadow’ banking system rose to fill this gap.”89 
Pozsar’s work complements the empirical literature described thus far by showing where 
the demand comes from, how it has changed over time, and how this has contributed to 
new financial innovations. 
In part because of the disagreements about how broadly money ought to be 
construed, but also because exceptionally safe, long-term assets can also serve 
noninvestment functions, a growing number of economists and others are studying the 
broader category of safe assets.90 Again, a range of techniques have been employed to 
measure the demand for such assets and a range of explanations have been given for that 
demand. For example, the concept of safe assets plays a prominent role in the work done 
by Ben Bernanke and co-authors on the “global saving glut” and related efforts to 
understand global capital flows in the past decade and their impact on systemic 
stability.91 Starting with an influential speech delivered in 2005, Bernanke argued that 
excess savings in certain developing countries and in countries with significant oil wealth 
were playing a fundamental role reshaping capital flows. In subsequent work, he and co-
authors provide a more detailed analysis of the type of assets that these other investors 
demanded to argue that prior to the Crisis, there was an excess demand for safe assets and 
that demand helps to explain the growth of securitization and other arrangements and 
others have built on this thesis.92  
Other economists have built upon and provided alternatives to Bernanke’s 
account while sharing his assessment that investor demand for safe assets played a role in 
laying the groundwork for the Crisis. For example, Ricardo Caballero has argued that 
                                                 
86 E.g., WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (William Clowes 
and Sons eds., 14th ed. 1924) (1873) (stating that a financial panic is “a sudden demand for cash”); 
GORTON, supra note 41, at 6 (“Whatever the form of the bank money, financial crises are en masse 
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“the root imbalance” at the core of the Crisis was that “[t]he entire world, including 
foreign central banks and investors, but also many U.S. financial institutions, had an 
insatiable demand for safe debt instruments.”93 In Caballero’s assessment, “the surge of 
safe-assets-demand is a key factor behind the rise in leverage and macroeconomic risk 
concentration in financial institutions in the U.S. (as well as the U.K., Germany, and a 
few other developed economies), as these institutions sought the profits generated from 
bridging the gap between this rise in demand and the expansion of its natural supply.”94  
Given that empirical work necessarily documents what has happened before, it is 
worth momentarily looking ahead. Even apart from the cyclicality that is common, there 
are reasons to expect increasing demand for safe assets. Two ways that money claims 
provide utility apart from their risk-adjusted returns are their capacity to facilitate 
transactions and to serve as a store of liquidity over time.95 Mervyn King, former Head of 
the Bank of England, believes that this latter function is increasingly important and will 
continue to grow in the years ahead.96 In his assessment, in a world plagued by radical 
uncertainty, money-like claims satisfy the desire of individuals, companies, and countries 
to self-insure against this increasingly uncertain future.97 This view also helps to explain 
why safe assets can sometimes serve as a substitute for short-term claims.98  
Safe assets also play an additional and increasingly important function in today’s 
financial landscape, that is, serving as collateral.99 As an initial matter, collateralized 
structures are a primary mechanism for converting safe (and sometimes less safe) assets 
into money-like claims.100 But safe assets are also used as collateral in a range of other 
financial transactions. As the financial system becomes increasingly interconnected and 
market participants increasingly enter into arrangements with others that entail future, 
contingent payment obligations, there is growing demand for high-quality collateral to 
reduce the credit risk such arrangements pose and the amount of counterparty risk 
monitoring parties must undertake. Post-Crisis regulatory reforms are contributing to and 
shaping, but not alone in creating, high demand for assets that can readily serve as 
collateral.101  
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Other post-Crisis regulatory changes further contribute to the demand for safe 
assets. The most obvious examples are new and heightened regulatory mandates 
regarding who must hold safe assets and in what amounts. Large banks in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, for example, are facing substantially heightened liquidity requirements.102 
While banks have long been subject to reserve requirements designed to ensure that 
banks could meet short-term liquidity demands, banks are now being asked to hold “high 
quality, liquid assets” in quantities sufficient to cover the bank’s liquidity needs during a 
period of market distress,103 and, separately, to enable an orderly resolution of the bank in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.104  
The types of institutions subject to liquidity requirements are also expanding. 
Mutual funds, for example, which traditionally have been subject only to market-based 
constraints and disclosure requirements, are now required by regulation to adopt and 
implement liquidity-management policies.105 Less obvious but no less important, other 
post-Crisis reforms may be contributing to nonfinancial firms’ demand for liquid assets. 
For example, recent changes may make it more costly for banks to issue lines of credit, 
reducing their incentive to do so and increasing the price they will demand to provide this 
service.106 A nonfinancial firm that can no longer depend on a standing line of credit as a 
means to satisfy its future liquidity needs may well opt to hold additional liquid assets to 
satisfy those needs. 
In sum, although there are ongoing debates on the margins, there is generally 
broad consensus with respect to the two points critical to the analysis here: (1) there is a 
sizeable amount of capital that is constrained by a preference for very safe, liquid assets; 
and (2) this demand creates price and demand discontinuities of sufficient magnitude to 
affect market activity.  
B. Use of Proxies to Facilitate Monitoring 
Another factor contributing to discontinuities in the demand for particular types of 
assets is the extensive use of proxies for financial asset quality. Credit ratings issued by 
the leading rating agencies have long been, and despite some recent changes remain, the 
most commonly employed proxy for the credit risk of a given financial asset.107 As with 
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money-like claims, the rating given to a financial instrument can provide utility apart 
from the instrument’s risk adjusted return. Investors can rely on proxies like credit ratings 
for a range of purposes, including reducing the effort they must expend acquiring 
information about a potential investment. But the importance of proxies often increases 
significantly when there is a separation between the person making the investment 
decision and the ultimate beneficiary of the funds being invested, as proxies are 
frequently employed to reduce agency costs and facilitate monitoring in such settings. 
As Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon have explained, “the agency costs of 
agency capitalism” have become a core challenge for financial markets.108 The rise of 
institutional investors and the way that they have displaced individuals as the dominant 
source of capital in the capital markets is vividly illustrated by changes in public equity 
markets. Gilson and Gordon document that “institutional investors, including pension 
funds, held only approximately 6.1% of U.S. equities” in 1950; that figure reached 28.4% 
in 1980; and, “[b]y 2009, institutional investors held 50.6% of all U.S. public equities, 
and 73% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S. corporations.”109 While Gordon and 
Gilson focus on the implications for firm governance, the trend they document also has 
important implications for investor preferences.  
One way that intermediaries provide assurances to would-be investors is through 
self-imposed limits on their holdings and other activities. Mutual funds, for example, 
regularly make pre-commitments that limit the types of assets that they can hold and in 
what amounts. In one of the first academic studies documenting the capacity of investor 
preferences to influence financial asset pricing, Andrei Shleifer examined the effects of 
the rise of mutual funds committed to tracking the S&P 500 Index.110 He found that an 
announcement that a company would be added to the S&P 500 resulted in a statistically 
significant capital gain of roughly 3% in that company’s stock price.111 Although 
alternative explanations have been proffered,112 the finding continues to be recognized as 
indicative of the influence of index funds on stock prices. More recent studies have also 
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documented the impact of institutional investors on financial market pricing in other 
domains.113  
Other types of mutual funds similarly have self-imposed limits on the types of 
assets they can hold. The Fidelity Short Term Bond Fund, for example, promises 
investors geographic diversity while also committing that it will “[n]ormally invest[] at 
least 80% of assets in investment-grade debt securities” and it will “[n]ormally maintain[] 
a dollar-weighted average maturity between three years or less.”114 Although most such 
limits are self-imposed, money market mutual funds are further subject to regulatory 
limits with respect to the quality and duration of the assets they can hold.115  
In exchange for agreeing to these restrictions, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) provides money market mutual funds greater flexibility than other 
types of funds with respect to accounting and redemption practices, allowing most retail 
money market funds to maintain a steady net asset value of $1.00.116 (The value of assets 
invested in money market mutual funds—just shy of $3 trillion as of March 31, 2017—is 
also testament to the demand for money-like claims and reflective of the ways that efforts 
to reduce agency costs can overlap with demand for safe assets.117)  
A number of other institutional forms, like insurance companies and banks, fall 
outside a simple agency model, yet give rise to similar challenges. The great bulk of the 
capital that insurance companies hold and invest will eventually be needed to satisfy 
claims by policyholders. Those policyholders pay premiums today with the expectation 
that an insurance company will be able to pay out should the contingency against which 
they have insured comes to pass. Similarly, bank depositors place money in a bank today 
with the expectation that it will be available on demand when they need liquidity in the 
future. Policyholders and depositors thus require some assurance that the firm to whom 
they are giving money today will be able to pay their claims in the future.  
 In practice, individual policyholders and depositors do little to monitor insurance 
companies and banks. Much of this apathy is a rational response to the fact that most 
banks and insurance companies are subject to extensive regulation and supervision and 
government-provided insurance limits the downside risks to which both types of 
claimants are exposed.118 Examining the regulatory regime governing each type of firm is 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q. J. 
ECONOMICS 229 (finding that the rise of large, institutional investors contributed to an increase in the price 
of large-company stocks relative to small-company stocks).  
114 FIDELITY SHORT-TERM BOND FUND SUMMARY, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/summary/316146208.  
115 See, e.g., Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2018).  
116 For a discussion of the traditional rules and post-Crisis reforms underway, see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 
ACTION ADOPTING MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM RULES (2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.pdf; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419, 230.482, 270.2a-7, 270.12d3-1, 
270.18f-3, 270.22e-3, 270.30b1-7, 270.31a-1, 270.30b1-8.  
117 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGM’T., MONEY MARKET FUND STATISTICS (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/mmf-statistics/mmf-statistics-2017-3.pdf. 
118 See generally NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, IMF FINANCIAL SECTOR INVESTMENT PROGRAM, SELF 
ASSESSMENT OF IAIS CORE PRINCIPLES (2009); ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 146 (Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs eds., 2d ed. 2005); MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL 
 
  24
thus the most direct way of understanding how efforts to restrain agency costs in these 
domains produces constrained capital, while bearing in mind the private arrangements 
that would have arisen in the absence of extensive state intervention.  
As an initial matter, banks and insurance companies control a massive amount of 
capital. Aggregate assets in banks (not their holding companies or affiliates) totaled $15.3 
trillion at the end of 2014.119 The U.S. insurance industry is also large and growing.120 
The net premiums taken in on just the two most significant lines of insurance—property 
& casualty and life, accident & health—well exceeded a trillion dollars a year in each of 
the last five years.121 According to the Federal Insurance Office, at year-end 2015, the 
accident and health sector of the insurance industry held approximately $6.3 trillion in 
total assets (including $2.4 trillion in separate accounts) and the property and casualty 
sector held approximately $1.8 trillion in assets.122 These are significant, potentially 
market-distorting, amounts of capital by any measure and a number of recent studies 
attest to the ways that insurance company investment decisions can have measurable 
effects on asset prices.123 
Turning to the ways this capital is constrained, both banks and insurance 
companies are subject to investment restrictions and risk-based capital requirements. The 
analysis here will use insurance companies to explore the impact of investment 
restrictions and banks to examine capital adequacy requirements. Limits on the types of 
assets that insurance companies can hold, like most insurance regulations, are 
promulgated at the state level. Most states follow one of two approaches promulgated by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) so the regulations are 
more uniform than the dispersion of authority might suggest.124 With respect to 
investment restrictions, the NAIC has issued two model acts, each of which takes a 
different approach to ensuring that firms pursue an appropriate investment strategy in 
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light of their large, contingent financial obligations.125 As Robert Klein explains, the first 
model act embraces a “prescriptive approach” and provides “relatively detailed and 
specific limitations on . . . the amounts or relative proportions of different assets insurers 
can hold to ensure adequate diversification and limit risk.”126 Thus, most insurance 
companies today are subject to portfolio restrictions that meaningfully limit the ability of 
insurance companies to hold lower grade assets and use credit ratings to demarcate what 
insurance companies can hold and in what amounts.127 These rules directly give rise to 
constrained capital. 
Risk-based capital adequacy requirements operate slightly differently than asset 
constraints. Rather than requiring firms hold or not hold particular types of assets, capital 
adequacy rules typically affect incentives by requiring firms to fund themselves with 
more equity when holding assets deemed to be more risky. The basic rationale for capital 
adequacy requirements are that a bank with a thicker equity cushion is less likely to fail 
and less incentivized to take excessive risk than an otherwise comparable but less well-
capitalized institution.  
The first generation of widespread capital adequacy requirements, promulgated 
internationally through the Basel Accords, used coarse indicators of the riskiness of a 
particular asset to calibrate the amount of high-quality capital, primarily equity, that a 
bank must hold.128 Regulators have also started to require that banks hold additional 
capital to address the risks that may not show up on a bank’s balance sheet, such as 
counterparty exposures arising from derivative transactions.129 Because banks perceive 
capital to be costly, these regulations give banks a reason to favor assets and activities 
that have lower capital requirements, holding all else equal.130 The empirical evidence 
available suggests that capital adequacy requirements sufficiently impact bank 
preferences to have material effects on asset pricing. For example, one study found that 
when the capital adequacy requirements for highly rated MBS were lowered in 2002, the 
price of commercial MBS went up relative to comparable corporate debt.131 
Although credit ratings were the primary, though never exclusive, factor 
determining an asset’s risk weighting, there have been attempts to move away from 
reliance on ratings. The first widespread attempt to reduce reliance on ratings was the 
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adoption of Basel II, which was designed to encourage firms to develop their own, more 
sophisticated portfolio-level risk management systems and to reduce reliance on 
ratings.132 The Crisis, however, revealed fundamental flaws in this regime as 
implemented. Banks’ internal risk management systems proved to be less sophisticated 
than they had claimed, regulators failed to identify and understand the weaknesses 
inherent in banks’ internal risk management regimes, and the thinner capital cushions the 
Basel II regime enabled proved insufficient to protect banks from the larger than 
anticipated losses they incurred.  
The Crisis revealed that ratings can be poor prognosticators of risk and using 
ratings for regulatory purposes can create problematic incentives.133 In response to these 
concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits reliance on credit ratings for federal regulatory 
purposes.134 The results of this effort have been mixed. For one thing, there is little 
indication that ratings have declined much in their importance.135 Credit ratings remain a 
centerpiece of private monitoring efforts and many state and foreign regulatory 
regimes.136 Moreover, few federal regulators have found superior alternatives. Many have 
replaced reliance on credit ratings with metrics that may be even less effective at 
capturing the risk inherent in a financial instrument, including some metrics promulgated 
by third party service providers who are less regulated, but not necessarily more reliable, 
than the credit rating agencies.137 These challenges reflect the fact that proxies serve a 
genuinely useful purpose in facilitating monitoring and oversight despite the associated 
challenges. 
Taking a more global perspective, there has been a shift back toward reliance on 
proxies. As a result of the perceived failures of relying on banks’ internal models under 
Basel II, coarser metrics have returned to fashion.138 Their use is also on the rise for 
insurance companies. For example, Europe has recently revised its regulatory framework 
for insurance companies.139 The centerpiece of the new regime is heightened capital 
adequacy requirements, in many ways akin to those long-imposed on banks, which are 
designed to promote the financial health of the institutions. Like Basel II, the directive 
allows large firms some freedom to individualize the metrics that they use, but many key 
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elements remain highly standardized, and implementation of the regime seems likely to 
alter the mix of financial assets that insurance companies will hold. According to Avinash 
Persaud, “[f]ollowing a series of quantitative impact assessments and simulations, 
investment managers of insurers generally accept that, as a result of the disproportionate 
impact on their after-capital-charge returns, [the new directive] will lead to a switch out 
of public and private equity, infrastructure bonds, property, and low-rated corporate 
bonds.”140 Taking a step back, this move is emblematic of ways that the post-Crisis 
regulatory reforms seem likely to increase the amount of constrained capital in the 
financial system in ways that include but also go beyond increasing the demand for safe 
assets.  
The preceding overview is just that—a brief introduction to some of the reasons 
that significant swathes of capital flowing into the financial system are subject to private 
or public constraints that are independent of the metrics used in classic asset-pricing 
models. There are plenty more. An increasing number of investors, for example, are 
altering their investment choices based on firms’ environmental, social, and corporate 
responsibility commitments.141 According to a recent report, approximately one-fifth of 
professionally managed assets, or $8.72 trillion, is now invested pursuant to sustainability 
constraints.142 The rapid rise of funds catering to investors’ interests in integrating 
nonfinancial values into their investment strategies is a prime example of an investor-
driven innovation, and the money in those funds is constrained capital for purposes of the 
analyses here.143 The following analysis shows that constrained capital is sufficiently 
pervasive to affect financial asset pricing and production, at least some of the time.   
III. Investor Preferences and Financial Innovation 
The existence of constrained capital has a number of implications. One of the 
most important is that countries and firms capable of issuing the type of instruments for 
which there is outsized demand can raise capital more easily and at a lower cost.144 These 
effects can be significant and typically benefit countries and firms that are large, pose 
modest credit risks, and issue debt in U.S. dollars or another desirable currency.145 
Entities like banks that can readily issue money equivalents enjoy particularly notable 
benefits in this regard.146 The focus here is not on the allocation-related implications of 
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constrained capital in settings when primary issuances alone more than suffice to satisfy 
the demand. Rather, the aim here is to determine when increased constrained capital is 
likely to spark innovation.  
This Part identifies the building blocks of modern financial engineering, some 
examples of innovations that arose or spread, at least in part, in response to investor 
demand, and the benefits and drawbacks that arise as those innovations spread. Against 
this background, the final subpart addresses the second requirement this Article identifies 
as necessary for innovation—demand sufficient to cover the costs of innovation.  
A. Investor-Driven Financial Innovation 
1. The Building Blocks 
a. Securitization  
The first critical tool is securitization. Securitization entails the sale of financial 
assets from the entity that originated those assets to a new investment vehicle specially 
created to house those assets. The originator selling the assets is usually required to make 
an array of representations and warranties regarding the quality of the assets sold and the 
processes employed during origination, so the originator has a financial interest in the 
quality of the assets it originates. Nonetheless, the sale extinguishes the originator’s 
property interest in those assets, and that interest is transferred in its entirety to the newly 
created vehicle. This is critical, as it enables a financing structure that depends solely on 
the quality of the financial instruments packaged into the securitization structure, not the 
creditworthiness of the entity that originated those instruments.147  
The other two features that are critical to most securitization structures are 
diversification and tranching. Tranching entails the creation of multiple distinct classes of 
instruments, all of which have different sets of rights to the cash flows produced by the 
underlying assets.148 While some securitization structures entail specialized tranches, 
such as interest-only or principal-only securities that have a right to payment only when 
there is an excess of cash flows of a particular type coming into the securitization 
structure, the primary function of tranches is to create a hierarchy among the different 
classes of securities issued. The rights of each class are set forth in a “waterfall,” specific 
to that securitization structure, which is designed to ensure that the senior tranches 
receive any interest and principal owed to them before the junior tranches receive any 
payments while also seeking to make the terms of the junior tranches sufficiently 
attractive to justify the higher risk they pose. Diversification is key to enabling the senior 
tranches to enjoy reduced exposure to the credit risk of the underlying instruments.149   
This process gives rise to a host of logistical challenges. These challenges include 
the ongoing monitoring of the underlying financial instruments, the collection of cash 
flows from those instruments, and the need to address the issues that arise when a party 
                                                 
147 For a more detailed description of how securitization structures work, see, for example, Kathryn Judge, 
Fragmentation Nodes: A Case Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 657, 672 (2012). 
148 See id.  
149 E.g., Joshua D. Coval et al., Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 628 (2009).  
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defaults on one of those instruments. Typically, these issues are addressed through the 
appointment of a servicer who is authorized to exercise many of the rights belonging to 
the holder of the instrument and who is given instructions with respect to how to handle 
standard challenges, like managing a foreclosure.150 Another logistical challenge, usually 
resolved through the appointment of a trustee, entails distributing payments to the various 
holders and enforcing other rights associated with ownership of the underlying 
instruments, such as pursuing an originator should an asset sold to the securitization 
vehicle fail to conform to the representations and warranties made by the originator at the 
time of sale.151 While these challenges are all significant, and there are meaningful limits 
to the resolutions used to address each, the magnitude of these challenges and the costs 
associated with addressing them generally declined as securitization structures spread, as 
the terms became more standardized and the persons assuming roles like those of a 
servicer and trustee were already in the business of playing those roles for other 
securitization structures.  
b. Derivatives 
The second tool that facilitates investor-driven financial innovation is the 
derivative, a category of transactions that involve obligations that reference but are 
otherwise independent of instruments used to raise capital for a productive 
undertaking.152 A simplified illustration of a credit default swap (CDS) demonstrates how 
these transactions work: Company A raises capital by issuing long-term debt. Parties X 
and Y later enter into an agreement pursuant to which Party X agrees to pay Party Y a 
fixed amount should Company A default on that debt. In exchange, Party Y pays Party X 
a recurring premium. Although it is possible that Party Y seeks protection from Party X 
because it is otherwise exposed to Company A, no such connection is required and often 
no such connection will exist. As with securitization, parties have devised ways to 
address the myriad logistical challenges that arise from these arrangements and, apart 
from regulatory considerations, the associated costs have tended to decline as swaps have 
become more pervasive and standardized.153 
Derivatives can play an important role reallocating risks among parties in ways 
that map onto their respective capacity to bear those risks.154 The focus here is not on the 
way they may be used by parties to hedge against exogenous risks, but rather on the way 
they are used to facilitate the reallocation of risks that arise in connection with financial 
                                                 
150 See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2009). See Part III.B., infra, for a 
discussion as to why these instructions are necessarily incomplete. 
151 See Judge, supra note 147.  
152 This Article uses the term “derivatives” to refer to CDS, interest rate swaps, and other obligations that 
reference another financial instrument or index but have no direct stake in it. See, e.g., Bruce Tuckman, In 
Defense of Derivatives: From Beer to the Financial Crisis, 781 Cato Institute 3 (2015) (noting that 
“[d]efining derivatives in a way that excludes MBSs and CDOs is not controversial in the policy context” 
and providing support from recent policy initiatives). 
153 See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 UNIV. CIN. 
L. REV. 1019, 1025–26 (2007) (describing the role that the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association has played in facilitating these processes). 
154 See generally Tuckman, supra note 152.  
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market activity. For example, by allowing the banks involved in securitization and other 
activities to offset some of the risks to which they would otherwise be exposed, 
derivatives played a critical role facilitating, directly and indirectly, much of the investor-
driven financial innovation that occurred prior to the Crisis.155 And, like securitization, 
derivatives can give rise to risks that did not previously exist, for example, by increasing 
interconnectedness.156 
2. Some Examples 
The way that securitization and other derivatives may be used to satisfy excess 
investor demand for particular types of financial instruments is best illustrated by 
example. This subpart provides highly simplified accounts of four transaction structures 
that arose and spread, at least in part, in response to investor preferences. The latter 
examples all build on the first, enabling the examples to further highlight the way the 
building blocks just described can be layered with each other and other innovations.157 
This structure also brings to light the way some forms of constrained capital can create a 
demand for other types of constrained capital.   
a. MBS 
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are the instruments issued by securitization 
structures in which the underlying instruments are home loans.158 The volume of MBS 
transactions skyrocketed in the early 2000s.159 Although a number of explanations have 
been given for this growth,160 one of the most frequently cited is excess demand for 
AAA-rated instruments.161  
                                                 
155 See infra Part III.A.2. 
156 See infra Part III.B. 
157 See Lerner & Tufano, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 47 (explaining that systemically 
important financial innovations are often embedded in an innovation spiral, such as when “one successful 
innovation provid[es] the raw material, or building blocks, for another”); Robert Merton, Financial 
Innovation and Economic Performance. 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 12–22 (1992) (describing “innovation 
spirals” in which innovations beget further forms of innovation). 
158 MBS include two subcategories: those backed by residential home loans (RMBS) and those backed by 
loans for commercial real estate. In line with most academic work on the topic, this Article uses MBS as 
shorthand for RMBS. 
159 See, e.g., Miguel Segoviano et al., Securitization: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead, at 9, 11 fig.5 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 13/255, 2013) (“Private-label residential MBS issuance in the United States 
increased from US$148 billion in 1999 to US$1.2 trillion by 2006 (Figure 5).”).  
160 Another rationale for securitization is that it economizes on information production. See, e.g., Peter 
DeMarzo, The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation, 18 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1 (2005); Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation, 45 J. 
FINANCE 49 (1990). As discussed further below, this is not necessarily an efficient outcome, as it can result 
in there being too few informed investors and fragility-enhancing information gaps when the good times 
end. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017) 
[hereinafter Information Gaps]; Samuel G. Hanson & Adi Sunderam, Are There Too Many Safe Securities? 
Securitization and the Incentives for Information Production, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 565 (2013). 
161 See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 119 (2011); Miguel 
Segoviano et al., supra note 159, at 30–35; Ben S. Bernanke et al., supra note 8, at fig.5. See also infra Part 
III.A. 
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To understand why the demand for AAA-rated instruments may have been such a 
powerful force prior to the Crisis, a little context is required beyond the explanations 
given above. Recall, investor-driven financial innovations are most likely to be cost-
justified when the demand for a particular type of financial asset exceeds the naturally 
available supply. As Bernanke and co-authors, among others, have demonstrated, foreign 
sovereigns—the so-called global saving glut (GSG) countries—held a significant portion 
of Treasury instruments and other agency securities (which enjoyed an implicit 
government backing) outstanding, and their acquisitions of these instruments increased in 
the period leading up to the Crisis. 162These acquisitions increased the aggregate demand 
for highly rated instruments and reduced the yields and availability of the safest assets. 
As a result, even though the GSG countries were not avid purchasers of privately issued 
AAA-rated instruments, their activity helps to explain the excess demand for these 
instruments.163   
b. CDOs 
Another financial innovation that arose and spread, at least in part, to satisfy the 
excess demand for AAA instruments prior to the Crisis is the CDO backed by MBS. 
CDOs of the type here at issue are second-level securitization structures in which MBS 
and potentially other credit instruments are packaged together into a new securitization 
structure. The rise of CDOs addressed the demand for AAA instruments in two ways. 
First, CDO transactions directly created more AAA-rated instruments by producing such 
instruments from lower rated credit instruments. Again, this was possible because of 
diversification requirements and the creation of hierarchical tranches that gave certain 
classes of the instruments issued payment priority over others. Second, CDOs served as 
ready buyers of MBS that did not have a AAA rating. Because the need to find a buyer 
for these tranches was often a friction on the rate at which MBS transactions could be 
consummated, the rise of CDOs increased the rate at which MBS transactions could be 
consummated.164  
The important role of CDOs along both dimensions is reflected in the dramatic 
relative growth of these transactions, which proliferated even more quickly than MBS.165 
Between 2004 and 2006 alone, the height of the boom, the issuance of new CDOs 
                                                 
162 See Bernanke et al., supra note 8, at 22 fig.2, 24 fig.4 (showing that China, other Asian countries, and 
the OPEC countries all had quite substantial positive current account surpluses between 2003 and 2007); 
see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks on the The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. 
Current Account Deficit (Mar. 10, 2005). 
163 See Bernanke et al., supra note 8, at 24 fig.4. 
164 See Judge, supra note 147, at 694 (describing how the rise of CDOs as buyers of BBB-rated MBS 
facilitated MBS transactions by enabling placement of the most informationally sensitive tranche); FIN. 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 161, at 128–30 (2011) (explaining how “CDOs [became] the 
dominant buyers of the BBB-rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities” and the effects of this shift). 
165 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 161, at 18 (“[F]rom the third quarter of 2006 on, banks 
created and sold some $1.3 trillion in mortgage-backed securities and more than $350 billion in mortgage 
related CDOs.”); id. at 129 (“Between 2003 and 2007, as house prices rose 27% nationally and $4 trillion 
in mortgage-backed securities were created, Wall Street issued nearly $700 billion in CDOs that included 
mortgage-backed securities as collateral.”); Miguel Segoviano et al., supra note 159, at 9 (“At the global 
level between 2000 and 2007, issuance of collateralized obligation (CDO) increased more than six times to 
US$1 trillion, while issuance of CDO-squared product increased eleven-fold to around US$300 billion.”). 
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increased by roughly 250%.166 One indirect effect of this proliferation of CDOs is that 
many of the banks sponsoring these transactions, which often retained a portion of the 
instruments issued, sought to hedge those positions using swaps. This led to greater 
interconnections among financial institutions and, ultimately, played a critical role in 
explaining why and how insurance company AIG ended up so exposed to the mortgage 
market.167 
c. Asset-backed Commercial Paper 
Although much of the demand for AAA-rated instruments came from banks, 
pension funds, and other investors that intended to hold the instruments, another 
meaningful source of the demand was institutions that intended to transform those assets 
into short-term, money-like instruments. An important financial innovation that used 
MBS and other asset-backed securities to produce money claims was asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) programs.168 At its height in 2007, total ABCP outstanding 
reached $1.2 trillion.169 This amount exceeded the aggregate value of unsecured 
commercial paper outstanding, including that issued by financial and nonfinancial firms, 
and it also exceeded the aggregate value of Treasury bills then outstanding.170 
These structures allow MBS and CDOs, among other assets, to be used to issue 
money-like claims.171 They do so through a complex set of arrangements that bear some 
similarities to securitization structures, in that underlying assets are packaged together in 
a new vehicle that issues effectively senior claims—in this case, claims with much 
shorter maturities—and lower priority instruments. These programs also have a number 
                                                 
166 See Faten Sabry & Chudozie Okongwu, How Did We Get Here? The Story of the Credit Crisis, 15 J. 
STRUCTURED FIN. 53, 61 (2009).  
167 See generally Serena Ng and Carrick Mollenkamp, Goldman Fueled AIG Gambles, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
12, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704201404574590453176996032. 
168 For a more in-depth analysis of how these structures work, see, for example, DBRS, ASSET-BACKED 
COM. PAPER CRITERIA REP.: U.S. & EUROPEAN ABCP CONDUITS - REQUEST FOR COMMENT (2013), 
http://www.dbrs.com/research/263140/asset-backed-commercial-paper-criteria-report-u-s-european-abcp-
conduits-archived.pdf; FITCH RATINGS, ASSET-BACKED COM. PAPER EXPLAINED (2001), 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/ABS/fitchabcp.pdf; 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: THE JOINT FORUM, REPORT ON SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES 
(2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf.  
169 FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, MARKET-BASED FIN.: ITS CONTRIBUTIONS AND EMERGING ISSUES, at 9 
(2016), http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-18.pdf (explaining that 
the aggregate value of U.S. ABCP peaked in July 2007 at $1.2 trillion and had fallen to “just $226 billion at 
the end of 2015”); see also Viral Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, Do Global Banks Spread Global 
Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–09, 58 
IMF Econ. Rev. 37, 38 (explaining that the value of outstanding ABCP was roughly $260 billion more than 
the value of outstanding Treasury bills). 
170 See Daniel Covitz et al., The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Market Fed. Res., Working Paper No. 2009-36, 2009), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf; for detailed information about the 
types and amounts of CP outstanding see BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., COM. PAPER RATES AND 
OUTSTANDING SUMMARY (2018), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/.  
171 See Covitz et al., supra note 170, at 10 (noting that two Moody’s reports suggested that between 25-27% 
of the assets underlying structured investment vehicles that Moody’s rated—a form of ABCP—were highly 
rated residential MBS); id. at 9 (“There were 36 ABCP CDO programs in July 2007, with ABCP 
outstanding of $47 billion”).  
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of additional features, such as arrangements with the bank sponsoring the ABCP program 
that often enable the vehicle to obtain liquidity support from the bank if needed.172 These 
structures also vary in important ways, and benefit from implicit as well as explicit 
commitments from the sponsoring banks.173 These details are beyond the scope of this 
Article, but they reflect the complexity that arises from investor-driven financial 
innovations and the ways such innovations can create mechanisms of contagion that may 
not be readily apparent.174 Collectively, these arrangements allowed the issuance of short-
term, safe assets of the type that the work by Carlson and his colleagues found operate as 
a substitute, even if not a perfect one, for short-term Treasuries.175 The rapid growth of 
these structures in the years leading up to the Crisis is also consistent with Pozsar’s 
findings regarding the growth of institutional cash pools during this period.176 As he 
explains, “because institutional cash pools’ money demand is not for transaction 
purposes, but for liquidity and collateral management as well as investing purposes,”177 
that demand is usually best satisfied by non-M2 types of money, such as ABCP.  
d. Exchange-traded Funds 
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and the mutual funds with which they compete are 
both investor-driven financial innovations. In contrast to the other forms here described, 
these innovations arose primarily in response to investor demand for low-cost ways to 
invest in diversified pools of assets while also ensuring the structure itself imposes 
constraints on how the investment manager can invest the capital in any given fund.178 
Both have grown rapidly. The aggregate value of funds in registered investment 
companies, a category dominated by mutual funds and ETFs, grew from less than $5.8 
trillion in 1998 to more than $19 trillion in 2016. 179 On a relative basis, ETFs have grown 
far more rapidly in recent years. Although they first appeared in the 1990s, and only 
                                                 
172 See, e.g., id. at 8–9 (“A liquidity bank, typically the conduit’s bank sponsor, provides a liquidity facility 
for each transaction to address timing mismatches between the payment streams of the assets and the CP 
maturity dates or to repay CP investors in the event that CP cannot be rolled, namely a market 
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173 See DBRS, supra note 168.  
174 See infra Part III.B. 
175 See infra Part III.B. 
176 See infra Part III.B. 
177 Pozsar, supra note 70, at 284.  
178 See generally SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (ETFS)—A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 
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See id. 
179 See INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN 
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY, at 9, fig1.1 (2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf; see 
generally SEC MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE, supra note 178.  
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began to grow meaningfully in the 2000s, total assets invested in ETFs now stand in 
excess of $3 trillion.180 This is nearly triple the amount invested in such funds just six 
years ago.181 Moreover, while mutual funds experienced net outflows of nearly $230 
billion in 2016, ETFs enjoyed an increase in issuances in excess of $280 billion during 
the same period.182  
Like mutual funds, ETFs commit to a particular investment strategy.183 That 
strategy may require the fund to closely track an identified index, like the S&P 500, or it 
may encourage the investment manager to seek above-market returns but in a given 
space, such as mid-cap growth companies or in U.S. healthcare companies. The primary 
difference between mutual funds and ETFs, from the perspective of a retail investor, is in 
how one acquires and sells shares of an ETF. For most traditional mutual funds, a holder 
would buy and sell his shares directly from the mutual fund issuing them, with the price 
of that exchange determined only once a day, based on the fund’s assessment of its net 
asset value.184 ETFs, by contrast, are actively traded. This enables retail holders to buy 
and sell shares anytime the relevant exchange is open, and at prices that are constantly 
adjusting.185 It also reduces the pressure on ETFs to regularly expand and contract their 
holdings in response to acquisitions and redemptions, providing tax advantages to the 
holders of many ETFs.186   
B. The Consequences 
1. Some Benefits 
ETFs represent a classic form of innovation. They are similar to mutual funds but 
in a form that often results in lower costs while also providing some additional benefits 
(in the form of liquidity and more favorable tax consequences). Finding ways to produce 
goods that are close substitutes to existing goods, but which are slightly less expensive or 
which offer additional functionality, is a traditional way that innovations create value. 
Moreover, consistent with innovation in other domains, the amount of value created 
                                                 
180 See Jeff Cox, Why the Massive Rise of ETFs May be Just Getting Started, CNBC, July 17, 2017, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/17/meteoric-rise-of-etfs-just-getting-started-blackrock-larry-fink-says.html; 
see generally PWC, ETFS: A ROADMAP TO GROWTH (2016), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/asset-
management/publications/pdfs/etfs-a-roadmap-to-growth.pdf. 
181 See Cox, supra note 180; see also PWC, supra note 180. 
182 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 179. 
183 See SEC MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE, supra note 178.  
184 See id. Work by Jeremy Stein suggests that most funds traditionally were open-ended, because allowing 
investors to redeem shares on a daily basis served as a signal of quality in a field in which skill levels 
varied, leading to an equilibrium in which all funds are open-ended. Jeremy C. Stein, Why are Most Funds 
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185 See SEC MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE, supra note 178. 
186 ETFs buy and sell shares to select authorized participants, an important mechanism for keeping the price 
of ETFs in line with the value of the underlying assets. But providing investors liquidity in a way that does 
not require the fund to sell underlying assets can have tax benefits for ETF holders. See generally 
Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange-traded Funds (BIS Working 
Paper No. 343, 2011), https://www.bis.org/publ/work343.pdf; see also Michael Chamberlain, What’s the 
Difference? Mutual Funds and Exchange Traded Funds Explained, FORBES (Jul. 18, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/2013/07/18/whats-the-difference-mutual-funds-and-
exchange-traded-funds-explained/#8d0f00f18ac4. 
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depends not only on the size of the marginal improvements but the size of the market for 
the goods produced. The strong and still growing demand for low-cost ways to hold 
diversified pools of assets helps to explain why ETFs have spread so quickly and may 
continue to do so.  
The structure of ETFs may also yield systemic benefits relative to mutual funds. 
At least in theory, ETFs do not face the same run risk as open-end mutual funds, even 
when backed by relatively illiquid assets.187 This immunity from runs is sufficiently 
valuable in terms of promoting systemic stability that two leading economists have 
proposed converting mutual funds into ETFs to capture this benefit. Although others have 
quite different takes on the implications of the spread of ETFs,188 this highlights the 
potential for innovations to, at times, have systemic benefits, particularly when they are 
displacing other innovative structures.189 The more ETFs there are relative to traditional 
mutual funds, the greater the systemic benefits in this regard.190 ETFs thus also illustrate 
the ways that the development and spread of investor-driven innovations can have 
important systemic ramifications. 
The question of whether and how securitization, the foundation of each of the 
other innovations just described, truly creates value is not going to be answered any time 
soon. As Joshua Lerner and Peter Tufano noted in a recent review of the literature, not 
only is it difficult to “determin[e] social welfare implications of securitization . . . , even 
establishing simpler facts . . . is not simple.”191 Although there is a “large body of 
papers,” “studies reach contradictory conclusions about” fundamental issues, including 
“whether riskier banks use securitization, whether they have lower funding costs, or 
whether securitization increases loan supply.”192 Despite the difficulty of drawing broad 
conclusions, there is evidence supporting the existence of both some benefits and some 
drawbacks. 
One of the most important benefits of investor-driven innovation is its potential to 
improve price efficiency and reduce the cost of capital for borrowers. For example, by 
expanding the types of investors who could provide capital to home loans, the 
innovations just described should have, and seemingly did, reduce the cost of getting a 
home loan.193 One study, outside the mortgage space, found that corporate borrowers 
paid an interest rate that was 17 basis points lower when their loan was subsequently 
                                                 
187 See Stephen Cecchetti & Kim Schoenholtz, Reforming Mutual Funds: A Proposal to Improve Financial 
Market Resilience, VOX EU (Nov. 15, 2016), http://voxeu.org/article/reforming-mutual-funds-proposal-
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188 See infra Part III.B.1.c.  
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securitized relative to otherwise similar loans that were not securitized.194 There was also 
an increase in the range of persons who could qualify for a home loan, contributing to the 
overall rate of U.S. home ownership reaching a record-breaking high of 69.2% in 
2006.195  
In addition, to the extent that investors enjoyed nonpecuniary benefits from 
holding the types of instruments these innovations produced, the increase in the effective 
supply of these instruments should also have increased those benefits. None of this is to 
say that these “innovations” were net positives or even that every instance in which they 
were used had benefits of the type just mentioned. But by understanding the driving 
forces behind the spread of these new types of financial instruments, we can also see 
some of the benefits that may have flowed from their spread. These are helpful to 
consider alongside the changing risks and other drawbacks that also accompany their 
spread. 
2. The Changing Risks 
a. Identifiable Risks Borne by the Parties Involved 
Virtually all investor-driven financial innovations create risks that would not 
otherwise exist.196 Some of these costs are identifiable and borne entirely by the parties 
involved. Separating the roles of originating a credit instrument and holding that 
instrument to maturity, for example, can give rise to moral hazard by reducing the 
incentives the originator has to ensure that the loan is an appropriate one to extend and 
the terms are commensurate with the underlying risk.197 Readily identifiable challenges 
are often mitigated through contractual and other means, and the incremental cost of 
using such devices tends to go down as an innovative structure spreads. Nonetheless, 
these tools remain costly, and are thus one of the reasons that the types of instruments 
here described are usually imperfect substitutes for sovereign or corporate bonds with 
similar ratings.  
The Crisis also revealed that many of the tools used to mitigate these costs were 
less effective than parties appreciated at the time. Despite the legal and reputational 
devices intended to ensure that originators were diligent when originating a loan for 
securitization, for example, the data shows there were weaknesses in these checks. 
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According to one study, loans that could be readily securitized were 10–25% more likely 
to default than otherwise similar loans that were not as conducive to securitization.198 
Nonetheless, for the most part, risks that are readily identifiable and internalized by the 
parties involved are more usefully thought of as among the costs of using innovative 
instruments than a source of concern for policymakers. 
b. Context-dependent Risks 
Other risks created by the spread of investor-driven financial innovations are 
borne, at least in part, by the parties to the transaction, but are not readily apparent when 
the transaction is consummated. One reason for unforeseen risks is that a risk may not 
arise directly from the transaction but instead from interactions between the structure a 
transaction creates and the environment in which the obligations subsequently arise. The 
risks associated with securitizing home loans illustrate these dynamics. Recall, when a 
loan is placed into a securitization vehicle, a servicer is employed to collect payments on 
the loan and address any logistical challenges that arise, but the rights to the cash flows 
from that loan now belong to the dispersed investors who hold the MBS issued. The best 
way to maximize the value of a loan in default changed, however, when housing prices 
nationwide fell dramatically, and most servicing agreements failed to provide servicers 
the discretion and incentives to make the modifications required to maximize loan value 
in the changed environment.199 This contributed to securitized loans being foreclosed at 
significantly higher rates than comparable loans retained by the originating bank, which 
did have good incentives and flexibility.200  
This example illustrates two distinct reasons that private mechanisms do not 
suffice to address the risks associated with investor-driven financial innovations. First, 
the inherent complexity and newness of many forms of preference arbitrage, coupled 
with the context-dependent nature of certain risks, virtually ensures that the parties will 
fail to identify and address all of the risks that might arise.201 Second, risks may be 
inadequately identified and addressed because they also impose costs on persons 
completely outside the regime. By increasing the proportion of home loans in default that 
were foreclosed upon, securitization accentuated a cycle of further depressing home 
values, and triggering yet more defaults and more foreclosures.202 The excess 
foreclosures thus affected neighboring homeowners, lenders to those homeowners, and 
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other third parties. The parties to a securitization transaction, however, had little incentive 
to consider the costs that the transaction might impose on such persons.  
c. Systemic Risk  
It is not a coincidence that many of the innovations described here had starring 
roles in the mechanisms through which the Crisis became manifest and spread through 
the rest of the financial system. Very often, to manufacture financial claims with 
characteristics that do not otherwise correspond to the characteristics of persons seeking 
financing entails steps that increase the complexity and interconnectedness of the 
financial system, which can increase systemic risk. As Lerner and Tufano have 
explained, “[g]iven the interconnected nature of the financial system, it would be 
surprising if the most widely adopted financial innovations did not contribute to 
systematic risk.”203  
The specific examples here provided bring this dynamic to life. The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, for example, concluded that CDOs contributed to the Crisis 
by “fuel[ing] demand for nonprime mortgage securitization and contribut[ing] to the 
housing bubble.”204 That MBS and CDO structures precluded securitized loans from 
being modified as often as loans held by banks likely also accentuated the depths of the 
bust that followed.205 
Focusing on information dynamics reveals another set of mechanisms through 
which the financial innovations described here contributed to the Crisis. For example, 
given that CDO managers conducted relatively little due diligence with respect to the 
assets that they placed into CDOs, and CDO structures were themselves complex 
arrangements, the spread of CDOs contributed to growing information gaps, that is, 
growing pools of pertinent information not known to any party, private or public. So long 
as confidence reigned, these information gaps had little effect on market functioning. 
Once questions started to arise about the value of MBS, however, investors became far 
less willing to acquire MBS, CDOs, or instruments exposed to MBS or CDOs, without 
better information. Because no one had the relevant information and because the pre-
Crisis conditions led to an underinvestment in the technology required to produce the 
information,206 these information gaps increased the degree of market dysfunction once 
panic set in.207 The increased interconnectedness of the financial system that often 
accompanies the spread of innovations similarly adds to the fragility of the overall 
system. In a paper formalizing these dynamics, Ricardo Caballero and Alp Simsek 
explain that “[d]uring normal times, banks only need to understand the financial health of 
their direct counterparties.” By contrast “when a surprise liquidity shock hits[,] . . . a 
domino effect of bankruptcies becomes possible, and banks become concerned that they 
might be indirectly hit.”208 These concerns and the lack of information regarding their 
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counterparties’ counterparties motivate banks to “hoard liquidity and turn into sellers”—
activities that directly contribute to the spread of a financial crisis. 209 
ABCP were also central to the Crisis.210 Daniel Covitz and co-authors, for 
example, show that the ABCP market underwent a swift and sharp contraction during the 
early stages of the Crisis.211 The “proximate cause” was a concern about exposure to the 
subprime MBS market, the effects of which were magnified by the lack of information 
ABCP had about the assets backing the ABCP that they held.212 Other studies reveal that 
the terms of the ABCP that survived changed materially during this period, with 
durations generally getting shorter, further increasing the vulnerability of the system to 
further shocks.213 And work by Viral Acharya and Philipp Schnabl shows how problems 
in the ABCP market led to problems for the banks who had sponsored ABCP 
programs.214 The contraction in the ABCP, even though triggered by concerns about a 
subset of instruments produced in the United States, thus quickly became a critical 
mechanism through which the adverse effects of the Crisis spread internationally.215  
Although more at the stage of speculation than realization, questions have also 
been raised about the systemic implications of the rapid spread of ETFs. As noted above, 
their structure has some benefits relative to mutual funds, the innovation that they are 
displacing, that may enable them to avoid runs during periods when mutual funds would 
be plagued by destabilizing withdrawals.216 Others, however, have identified a number of 
mechanisms through which ETFs may increase fragility. A BIS paper, for example, 
identified four ways that they could undermine stability including the potential that 
complexity could undermine effective monitoring.217 In a similar spirit, the SEC has 
initiated an effort to explore the ramifications of the spread of ETFs.218 As one 
Commissioner recently argued, in light of recent disruptions causing the price of ETFs to 
deviate significantly from the underlying assets, “it may be time to reexamine the entire 
ETF ecosystem.”219  
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As these examples illustrate, investor-driven financial innovations can play an 
important role bridging the gap when investor demand for a particular type of financial 
instrument exceeds the natural supply. The spread of investor-driven financial 
innovations can thus play an important role enabling constrained capital to flow into new 
domains in ways that benefit investors and borrowers alike. But new financial 
innovations also pose a range of challenges that are often inadequately addressed by the 
parties involved. This may be due to the newness of the instrument or to the tendency of 
economic booms, during which innovations often spread, to disguise risks.220 The more 
important challenge, and the one directly relevant to policymakers, is that the creation 
and spread of investor-driven financial innovations can increase the complexity, 
interconnectedness, and rigidity of the financial system—all changes that have been 
shown, at least in some environments, to increase systemic risk.221 And there are likely an 
array of other mechanisms through which they may further exacerbate fragility or reduce 
resilience in ways that are hard to identify and address in advance.222  To be sure, as in 
the case of ETFs, there is the possibility that a new innovation will change financial 
intermediation in ways that reduce rather than exacerbate fragility. Context is critical. 
That investor-driven financial innovations can both enhance and harm systemic 
resilience, however, only increases the importance of having regulators to pay heed to 
these dynamics when taking actions that could spur system-changing innovations. 
IV. Regulation, Preferences, and Innovation 
The first two Parts provide the descriptive groundwork needed to consider when 
regulation will lead to innovation and why policymakers should care. This Part builds on 
that groundwork to consider two conditions for an intervention to affect innovation—a 
change in aggregate demand and a price impact. This first subpart provides an overview 
of the different ways that regulation may affect the aggregate amount of constrained 
capital in the financial system and the amount of capital subject to a particular constraint. 
The second addresses cost as a friction for innovation. 
A. The Role of Regulation  
1. Substitute for Private Monitoring 
Even in the absence of any regulation, banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, and most other financial institutions would face constraints in how they could 
deploy the capital in their possession. During the “free banking era,” for example, banks 
had larger capital cushions than they currently do and many also stockpiled cash as a way 
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of assuring depositors of the sufficiency of their liquidity reserves.223 Even today, many 
banks hold more capital or liquid assets than regulations require.224 This is because, as 
noted in a recent IMF Report, “Banks have intrinsic incentives to hold safe assets . . . . 
Safe assets—particularly short-term government securities—play a key role in banks’ 
day-to-day asset-liability management.”225 Among other virtues, “[s]horter-term safe 
assets permit banks to curb unwanted maturity mismatches and manage their short-term 
funding needs.”226  
Banks also have non-regulatory reasons for wanting to be well capitalized.227 
Today, the government is often inextricably intertwined with these institutions, as the 
government now provides formal guarantees to claim holders in each of these settings, 
creating moral hazard that can only be mitigated through oversight and risk restrictions. 
Nonetheless, the overall edifice serves aims that, at least in part, would be addressed 
through market-based mechanisms in the absence of regulation.228  
Developing a baseline to assess the actual role of regulation in these settings is 
exceptionally difficult. This is in part because of the long history of regulation in these 
domains. It also reflects the fact that explicit and implicit government guarantees distort 
incentives even in the absence of regulation. As a result, a regulatory intervention that 
reduces moral hazard arising from the government intervention may appear to increase 
the aggregate demand for a particular type of financial instrument, but it may in fact 
merely be reducing the aggregate distortion arising from government intervention. The 
process of conceptually focusing on what a baseline might look like is key to 
understanding just how distortive government policies are, and are not, in these domains.  
An additional value in establishing this type of baseline is that it can provide 
guidance with respect to the relative power, and impotence, of changes in the regulatory 
regime. Although the focus here is on the way a regulatory regime that serves as a 
substitute for private monitoring does not necessarily increase constrained capital, the 
inverse is also true: Removing regulations that are a substitute for private monitoring 
does not necessarily reduce the amount of constrained capital. This is reflected in the 
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mixed results of efforts to reduce regulatory reliance on credit ratings.229 Monitoring risk-
taking is tricky business, whether done by regulators or market participants, and proxies 
are exceptionally useful when information asymmetries and information costs are taken 
into account. Thus, prohibiting reliance on a particular type of proxy cannot be assumed 
to bring about a meaningful change in behavior unless accompanied by an assessment of 
why the proxy is being used and what else might serve that function. Similarly, when a 
firm’s capital structure subjects it to private discipline alongside the regulatory regime, 
changing a regulatory burden will not necessarily result in less stringent constraints or 
less constrained capital.  
Collectively, this suggests that many of the regulatory regimes that most 
obviously produce constrained capital are not as transformative as they superficially 
appear.230 This does not deny that these types of interventions may impact investor 
preferences in ways that influence innovation. Even when a regulatory regime is nothing 
but a substitute for private monitoring, the particular rules adopted can shape the 
thresholds around which demands for constrained capital arise and the size of the demand 
around those thresholds.231 Nonetheless, the importance of these interventions with 
respect to innovation is likely to be more modest than is commonly assumed. 
2. Other Policy Aims 
Financial regulation also serves aims beyond coordinating the protections that 
stakeholders would otherwise demand. To the extent that a regulatory intervention aims 
to reduce negative externalities, or to further other policy aims, the intervention is far 
more likely to fundamentally alter the amount and type of constrained capital in the 
financial system. Although often difficult in practice to distinguish regulations that 
replicate private constraints from those that address externalities, this distinction is key to 
understanding conceptually when the law alters the amount of constrained capital in the 
system.  
Banking illustrates how regulatory interventions can serve multiple aims. The 
capital requirements imposed on banks, for example, function in part as a substitute for 
what the market would otherwise require. Because of deposit insurance and other 
expectations of government support, these types of regulations are required to re-establish 
the market discipline that would be imposed on banks in the absence of government 
support. At the same time, these regulations are designed to reduce the negative 
externalities that can arise when a bank fails. Because of contagion and information loss, 
bank failures may result in social costs that exceed the costs borne by a bank’s 
stakeholders.232 As a result, capital requirements imposed by reference to the riskiness of 
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a bank’s assets are often more demanding than would be required if the sole function was 
to substitute for private oversight.  
Another example of the law intervening to both replicate private discipline and 
address spillovers is the changes underway in the derivatives market. To address 
concerns about the role derivatives played in the Crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates a 
number of important changes in how this market operates.233 Of particular relevance here 
are new requirements that standardized derivatives be centrally cleared and heightened 
collateral requirements for derivatives that are instead executed over-the-counter (OTC), 
that is, as bilateral agreements.234 These changes reduce the probability that parties will 
experience losses as a result of counterparty failure, so they clearly overlap with the type 
of private protections derivative market participants have long demanded. Yet, the 
requirements are more robust than those the market had demanded previously and are in 
forms that the market had not otherwise embraced on a widespread basis, which is 
consistent with policymakers’ belief that derivative exposures can be a mechanism of 
contagion during periods of financial distress and that, therefore, there are externalities 
that the parties are not incentivized to address. The long-term ramifications of these 
changes remain uncertain and staged implementation makes the impact of the regulations 
difficult to parse, but initial estimates suggest that the revised regime will require 
derivatives market participants to post and maintain significantly more collateral than the 
market previously demanded and thus will increase aggregate demand for safe assets.235  
3. Indirect Effects 
The focus thus far has been on regulatory regimes that expressly require or 
incentivize institutions to hold particular types of financial claims. But the law can also 
have powerful indirect effects on investor preferences. This is illustrated by some of the 
ways that the law affects the demand for money and other safe assets. One of the primary 
reasons that people demand such assets is as a way of self insuring in anticipation of 
future, and often uncertain, needs.236 This demand is not determined in a vacuum, but 
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rather is shaped by people’s expectations regarding their ability to access external 
financing when needed.  
A traditional function of banks is to provide clients liquidity insurance. When a 
person puts money into a demand deposit account, the bank assumes the obligation to 
make those funds available to the depositor whenever the depositor needs liquidity in the 
future. A different way that banks provide liquidity insurance is through lines of credit. 
Individuals, for example, may have a home equity line of credit.237 This might be used as 
a safety cushion against the risk of temporary unemployment or an unexpected 
expenditure. Companies, similarly, use lines of credit to address the risk that information 
problems, commitment concerns, or external developments may impede their ability to 
access credit in a timely and cost-effective manner at some point in the future.  
State actors also play an important role in providing liquidity insurance. Since its 
founding, a core role of the Federal Reserve is to provide a form of liquidity insurance by 
committing to make collateralized loans to banks facing excess withdrawals.238 This role, 
commonly referred to as the lender of last resort, is one that the Fed and other central 
banks continue to play to this day.239 When the legal rules governing the capacity of the 
Fed to provide liquidity support to banks and nonbanks change, it changes the 
calculations financial institutions must undertake when assessing the optimal level of 
liquid reserves to hold. This example also highlights the difficult tradeoffs at stake, many 
of which are beyond the scope of this analysis. Forcing banks and nonfinancial firms to 
hold high levels of liquid assets by limiting access to a reliable form of liquidity 
provision can minimize moral hazard, but it can also impose significant costs on these 
institutions and may deter lending and investments that are otherwise socially valuable.240  
Shifting yet one more level, loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
countries unable to pay their debts are yet another insurance-like product—one that alters 
the incentives a country faces when assessing the level of liquid reserves. The more 
difficult it is to obtain such a loan, or the less acceptable the terms imposed on it, the 
greater incentive a country has to self insure. 
Each of these examples illustrate the importance of taking a broad view of the 
range of government actions that affect the amount of constrained capital in the financial 
system. As Bernanke explained, the global saving glut, which appears to have played a 
significant role in shaping pre-Crisis financial markets, arose because emerging market 
countries sought to build up “‘war chests’ of foreign reserves” that could “be used as a 
buffer against potential capital outflows” following the financial crises that spread 
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through Asia and Latin America in the 2000s.241 This heightened demand for safe assets 
was shaped not only by countries’ increased appreciation of how quickly foreign capital 
could exit, but also in light of new information regarding the loss of autonomy that a 
country would face as a result of the onerous conditions that accompanied any effort to 
address those shortfalls by borrowing from the IMF.242 Had IMF loans been more 
forthcoming and less conditioned, the IMF interventions would have resulted in even 
more moral hazard than they did; but, the magnitude of the global saving glut might also 
have been smaller, as countries may have felt less compelled to self insure to address 
future capital needs. Regardless of the merits of the IMF decision, the example illustrates 
the importance of looking beyond rules that explicitly require or incentivize firms to hold 
particular types of assets in seeking to assess how state actions affect the amount of 
constrained capital in the financial system. 
The new liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), designed to enhance the capacity of 
banks to withstand periods of systemic distress, further illustrates the challenge of 
assessing the impact of government interventions and the optimal degree of self 
insurance. The LCR requires subject banks to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to 
support the bank’s operations for thirty days during a period of systemic distress.243 It is 
individualized in the sense that it focuses on that bank’s expected cash inflows and 
outflows, but it ignores a range of factors that would otherwise be material in assessing 
just how much liquidity a bank should hold.244 The standardized nature of the 
requirement suggests it is almost inevitably distortive, but whether this is more or less 
liquidity than an average bank would hold absent any type of government intervention in 
the banking system is far from clear. On the one hand, the LCR requires virtually all 
affected banks to hold more safe assets than they held in the absence of the LCR.245 On 
the other hand, a primary rationale for the LCR is that pre-Crisis banks held too few safe 
assets, in part because of expectations of government support.246  
These examples illustrate the challenge of trying to develop an appropriate 
baseline from which to assess the effects of an intervention or other rule change. When a 
central bank stands ready as a lender of last resort, banks have less incentive to carry 
adequate liquidity to address depositor demands. At the same time, the only way to 
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Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending During the 2007–09 U.S. Financial Crisis, Bd. of Governors of 
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reduce such interventions in the future). 
246 Id. 
  46
ensure banks have sufficient reserves to meet depositor demands in the absence of 
external support—requiring banks to hold 100% reserves against deposit—has been 
rejected time and again for more than a century, seemingly reflecting a consensus that the 
drawbacks exceed the stability-enhancing benefits.247 Additionally, the market-only 
approach of allowing banks to issue as many money claims as the market will allow, but 
denying any government support in the event of failure, has not been followed by any 
industrialized nation, presumably because of the adverse spillover effects on the real 
economy that flow from banking crises.248 The analysis here does not require or provide a 
conclusion regarding the optimal level of insurance to allow in today’s multi-leveled 
system, nor does it address the full range of costs associated with self insurance. This 
Article does, however, contribute to this discussion by drawing attention to the often-
overlooked relationship between the amount of insurance provided and the complexity 
and fragility of the financial system. 
B. The Importance of Price  
Having established when an intervention is properly credited with changing 
investor preferences, and thus increasing the aggregate demand for a particular type of 
financial instrument, the question becomes when such increased demand will spur 
innovation. This leads to the second condition this Article identifies as key—a price 
impact. This is required because innovations are costly to produce and costly to 
deploy.249 These costs take different forms. Some, like the fees paid to the lawyers, 
servicers, and other parties involved when a securitization transaction is consummated, 
are readily identifiable as costs. Others, like the new risks that arise from a transaction 
structure and the tools deployed to minimize those risks, are not as readily monetized. 
The costs of deploying an innovation can also go down, sometimes quite significantly, as 
structures become more pervasive and the tools used to manage the risks are more 
standardized. Nonetheless, to the extent they are known or suspected by the parties at the 
time a transaction is consummated, they effectively function as a cost that will cause the 
parties to discount the innovative technique relative to the original. This is consistent with 
the evidence that private claims can serve as substitute for publicly issued safe assets, but 
that they seem to be imperfect substitutes and the demand for such private instruments 
tends to wane when there is a robust supply of public instruments available.250 
This requirement serves as an important filtering device for identifying when the 
tendency of an intervention to produce constrained capital is likely to lead to the spread 
of innovations in ways that alter the structure of the financial system. It highlights that it 
is not constrained capital by itself that is problematic (at least for the reasons identified 
here), but rather, constrained capital in settings where there is a high degree of buildup 
around a particular threshold.  
Two additional considerations can help when translating this concept into 
guidelines for policymakers. First, innovation itself may be a flag of a muted price 
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impact. Like innovation generally, financial innovation increases the supply of close 
substitutes for a desired product, causing prices to fall and yields to rise. As a result, 
although depressed yields on a particular category of assets indicate a domain where it 
may be possible to cover the cost of innovation, the lack of recognizably lower yield does 
not rebut this possibility; it may indicate instead that innovation already underway has 
minimized the price impact that would otherwise have developed.  
Second, price impact is not static. The impact of an intervention, both in terms of 
the demand it helps create and the readily available supply, may vary over the course of a 
credit cycle and in response to other exogenous developments. These are particularly 
important considerations for so-called safe assets. The post-Crisis reforms, like many 
reform efforts, were put into place shortly after a massive financial crisis which caused 
market participants and policymakers alike to fundamentally reassess the risks associated 
with particular types of assets and unload assets that were riskier or about which less was 
known. These patterns are common.251 As a result, even without any regulatory reform, 
the Crisis would have triggered significant changes in how financial institutions manage 
risks, the pricing of risk, and the range of assets that market participants would be willing 
to treat as safe. And, if history is any indication, there will again be a period of normalcy 
that eventually leads to another period of froth; and it is during the period of froth that 
demand for safe assets will most likely exceed the supply and that market participants 
may be most ready to accept innovative substitutes as safe.252 The recent empirical work 
in this domain also highlights the importance of understanding how the supply of 
Treasury instruments affects the demand for privately issued instruments.253 Current 
government spending could ease the excess demand for safe assets in the near future, 
perhaps quite significantly, but that would not moot the potential for interventions to have 
important distortive effects in time. 
V. Implications for Policymaking 
Having identified a concrete mechanism through which the law affects the 
structure and resilience of the financial system, this Article also demonstrates why 
regulators must think in structural terms about the ramifications of proposed regulatory 
changes. One of the core mantras to emerge from the Crisis is that maintaining systemic 
stability requires policymakers to consider how market developments and regulations 
affect the financial system as a whole. Excessive focus on microprudential aims, that is, 
promoting the safety and soundness of individual institutions, and insufficient attention to 
macroprudential aims, that is, ensuring the stability of the financial system as a whole, is 
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widely recognized as one of the major regulatory shortcomings pre-Crisis.254 This Article 
provides fresh support for the importance of taking a systemic perspective on financial 
regulation, and it provides new insight into what is needed to achieve that aim.255  
All of the policies identified here as contributing to constrained capital are 
designed to further important policy aims. This reflects the fact that the regulators 
promulgating these policies often lack the means and incentives to consider the systemic 
implications of the policies they are adopting. This is in part due to regulatory 
architecture, which remains fragmented and balkanized in the United States despite 
modest post-Crisis improvements. But it is also a byproduct of the type of factors 
regulators are required or encouraged to consider when engaging in rulemaking. Most 
important, by far, are the costs and benefits of a particular regulatory change. Although 
there is much to this approach conceptually, as John Coates has shown, quantified cost-
benefit analysis is poorly suited to financial rulemaking. Among the reasons for the poor 
fit is that “finance . . . is characterized by non-stationary relationships that exhibit secular 
change (that is, long-term structural changes),” reducing the benefits of cost-benefit 
analyses in finance that are and “are likely to remain low.”256  
A. Investor Demand and Innovation Analysis 
In making concrete an important mechanism through which the law affects the 
structure and fragility of the financial system, this Article also shows how to improve the 
rulemaking process so regulators consider the more speculative, but often more 
important, structural ramifications of their actions. One way of understanding the 
proposed framework is as a two-part filter for identifying the types of interventions most 
likely to spur innovation in unintended ways, and thus the domains where greater caution 
is warranted. This framework may be used to identify those interventions most likely to 
spur financial innovation. The claim is that when this framework warrants, regulators 
should be required to estimate how their actions will affect aggregate investor demand 
and to provide a written analysis of how the markets might respond in light of the 
changed demand. They should further be required to undertake follow up analyses 
subsequent to implementing the change to assess the accuracy of their original 
assessments and identify any unexpected changes.   
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At first, it may be challenging for regulators to undertake the proposed “Investor 
Demand and Innovation” analyses. Fortunately, regulatory competence is not static. 
Rather, it evolves over time in light of the demands regulators face. In response to the 
demand to engage in cost-benefit analyses, regulators hired economists and 
fundamentally altered their rulemaking processes to satisfy new demands.257 The process 
proposed is likely to reveal significant deficiencies in regulatory competencies in addition 
to exposing gaps in the data regulators have available to them and the models that can be 
used to project how changes in investor preferences will alter market practices. That 
financial regulators may not be well positioned to undertake these analyses currently is 
thus not a reason to avoid such a mandate, but a reason to impose it.  
B. Two Starting Points  
In addition to showing why regulators should be required to assess the structural 
impact of their actions, the analysis above identifies two categories of actions where such 
analyses should be required. First, whenever regulatory changes directly require or 
incentivize market participants to hold particular classes of financial assets, regulators 
should be required to undertake the proposed ex ante and ex post Investor Demand and 
Innovation analyses. The framework here reveals that many such interventions may be 
less transformative than is commonly assumed. Nonetheless, the reason for that is that 
these are areas where market-based forces may otherwise play an important role in 
producing constrained capital along the same lines the regulatory change mandates. As 
the examination here reveals, innovations are most likely to arise and spread when there 
is significant buildup in demand around a particular threshold. Forcing regulators to 
develop a more sophisticated understanding of the private sources of constrained capital 
is thus nearly as important, and an important complement to, efforts to understand how 
legal changes alter investor demand.  
Second, the analysis here further supports requiring regulators to engage in 
Investor Demand and Innovation analyses when making changes that are likely to have a 
material impact, either by increasing or decreasing the aggregate demand for safe assets. 
The framework proposed here identifies this as a critical site for heightened regulatory 
attention. Starting first with the required price impact, the evidence available highlights 
that safe assets, including but not limited to those with short-term durations that function 
in ways similar to money, often are issued at prices below what the risk-adjusted returns 
would seem to demand.258 As reflected in the examples of financial-driven innovation 
here,259 but also in the much longer history of safe assets going back to precious metals 
and bank notes, the demand for safe assets has often been a driver of transformative 
financial innovations. These different types of evidence all point to safe assets as a 
domain where changes in aggregate demand may well spur innovation. Having 
established this, the framework’s first condition—that legal interventions matter when 
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they alter aggregate demand—then serves as the mechanism for identifying the range of 
government interventions that merit heightened attention.  
Significantly, this requirement would help regulators to pay greater heed to the 
indirect mechanisms through which their actions can affect investor demand. For 
example, this requirement would promote the development of the models and data 
required to understand how legal interventions that affect incentives to self insure can 
drive innovation. Just as importantly, this type of analysis could enable regulators to 
identify interventions that might reduce, not just exacerbate, systemic fragility. As an 
example, recent work by Jeremy Stein and other leading economists suggests that the 
government should increase its production of short-term safe assets to reduce the 
production of private substitutes that are so often the source of fragility.260 The proposed 
Demand and Innovation analyses would function as an institutionalized mechanism for 
assessing the value of such changes and where best to make them. 
C. Regulatory Architecture 
Apart from providing new insight into how best to institutionalize structural 
analyses into financial rulemaking, the examination here also provides new support for a 
well-recognized regulatory challenge: regulatory architecture. All of the policies 
identified here as contributing to constrained capital are designed to further important 
policy aims. The challenge is that bank regulators remain incentivized to maintain 
healthy banks, while insurance regulators want to promote the health of insurance 
companies and the SEC wants to ensure that mutual funds function as investors expect. 
These regulators often also regularly lack the information and competence required to 
design policies that take into account the ways regulations may spur innovation.  
This Article thus provides yet further evidence of the drawbacks inherent in the 
disaggregated financial regulatory regime still in place in the United States.261 It thus 
affirms the importance of some of the structural changes to that architecture that have 
emerged post-Crisis, like the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC)262 and the Office of Financial Research (OFR)263 in the United States and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) at a global level.264 It further suggests these types of 
bodies should likely have more authority and resources than they do, or we should make 
more fundamental changes to the federal financial regulatory architecture. Having bodies 
specifically designed to have a systemic view and tasked with promoting systemic 
stability is critical to developing the infrastructure required to identify the range of public 
and private actions affecting the amount of constrained capital around particular 
thresholds and to assess the ramifications of that demand on innovation and fragility.  
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The call for Investor Demand and Innovation analyses also provides yet another 
mechanism through which to enhance coordination across regulatory bodies. For 
example, it may be appropriate to require any financial regulatory body that wants to 
undertake a rule change of the kind that would require such an analysis to either 
undertake that work independently or to work with the FSOC and OFR to produce the 
required analyses. This could expedite the rate at which data and other deficiencies are 
identified and addressed, in addition to potentially promoting the background work, like 
financial system mapping, that could further enhance the capacity of regulators to assess 
the systemic ramifications of their actions.  
D. Bigger Picture  
The process of undertaking the proposed analyses and the mapping that would 
emerge from these efforts also might enable a more fruitful approach to financial 
regulation. There is a large and ever-growing body of research on the sources of financial 
fragility and how best to promote financial stability. Most of the research that has been 
done on systemic stability, however, focuses on identifying sources of fragility or 
weakness. This is valuable research and has produced powerful insights regarding 
mechanisms through which crises spread and hamper economic growth. But, as one 
might expect, research focused on identifying weak spots in a financial system leads to 
policy recommendations aimed at shoring up those weaknesses. The heightened capital 
and liquidity requirements being imposed on banks, for example, are the byproduct of 
research into bank fragility and the adverse effects of banking panics. The recent efforts 
to impose liquidity requirements on mutual funds are similarly motivated by new insights 
regarding the fragility of these structures.265 The analysis here does not undermine the 
value of such research and reforms, but it does suggest that they may have unintended, 
adverse side effects. By increasing the amount of constrained capital in the system, these 
reforms may well spur investor-driven financial innovations not all that different in kind 
from those that contributed to the Crisis.  
Recognizing the numerous ways that the law shapes financial market structures 
and the heterogeneity in the resilience of those structures demonstrates the value in taking 
a fundamentally different approach to studying financial stability. It starts with the 
recognition that credit creation and liquidity transformation are socially valuable 
activities that play an important role contributing to economic growth. Yet, they also 
entail risk. Some of these risks, like credit and liquidity risk, are inevitable. Others, like 
the fragility that arises from interconnectedness and complexity, are not. Rather, it is the 
design of the institutions that extend credit and engage in maturity transformation that 
determines the magnitude of these ancillary risks. This Article shows how legal 
interventions, including some specifically designed to promote stability, can cause the 
design of the financial system to morph in ways that increase ancillary risks.  
An alternative approach to studying financial stability would build on the fact that 
extending credit and producing money-like assets entail risks, and then ask who is best 
suited to bear those risks. In other words, in addition to identifying points of weakness 
and mechanisms through which adverse shocks trigger market dysfunction, research 
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could focus on identifying nodes in the system capable of withstanding losses and 
structures that would dampen the ripple effects that can emanate from shocks. In contrast 
to the typical policy recommendations, which aim to reduce the risks certain institutions 
assume, this could lead to recommendations to encourage institutions that are well suited 
to bear certain risks to assume those risks.266  
 The question of how best to construct a financial system that can absorb losses 
without triggering panics is closely related to another issue embedded in the analysis 
here—what is the optimal degree of self insurance against various needs, and when, if 
ever, should the state play a role in providing insurance when the market does not—or 
cannot? Again, there is already some very valuable research in this vein, but the questions 
that remain dwarf the insights thus far provided.267 Both approaches highlight the 
importance of thinking in systemic terms in the ongoing effort to create a financial 
system capable of supporting growth, while minimizing unnecessary sources of fragility. 
VI. Conclusion 
Investor-driven financial innovation is far from a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, 
discontinuities in investor demand continue to be assumed away in much of the legal and 
financial literature and ignored by policymakers who rely on that literature. This Article 
highlights the costs of those simplifying assumptions. It brings to light the first-order 
importance of investor preferences in shaping today’s financial markets and the way 
investor-driven financial innovations can increase the fragility of those markets. More 
importantly, in providing a framework for understanding the relationship among 
constrained capital, investor-driven financial innovations, and the law, this Article lays 
the groundwork for identifying the interventions most likely to have unintended, systemic 
consequences.  
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